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GIVING MEANING TO “MEANINGFUL ENOUGH”:  




Generally, defendants cannot raise new claims in a writ of habeas corpus 
unless they can accomplish the difficult task of showing that they could not 
have raised the claims earlier.  In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court laid out an 
equitable exception that allows defendants to claim—for the first time in a 
writ of habeas corpus—that they had an ineffective trial attorney if their 
failure to make a timely claim was due to a second ineffective attorney or 
no attorney whatsoever.  The exception, however, only applied to 
defendants in states that required ineffective assistance claims to be 
brought in collateral proceedings, as opposed to allowing the claims on 
direct appeal.  However, a year later, when faced with inequity in Texas, 
the Court broadened the exception, applying it to any state that does not 
provide a defendant with a meaningful opportunity to initially raise that 
claim, regardless of the forum they chose. 
In doing so, the Court neglected to explain how “a meaningful 
opportunity” should be measured.  This Note seeks to provide that 
explanation, arguing that it must depend on whether a defendant is 
provided with a new, unconflicted attorney on appeal.  If the same attorney 
represents a defendant at trial and on appeal, a defendant cannot 
meaningfully challenge his lawyer’s performance at trial.  If a defendant 
does not receive new counsel on appeal, habeas courts should consider 
claims of ineffective assistance regardless of the procedural history of the 
case. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Lawrence Landrum was sentenced to death in 1986 for the murder of 
eighty-four-year-old Harold White.1  Landrum was convicted of 
bludgeoning White and cutting his throat after he stole $80 in cash and 
more than 200 nerve pills from White’s apartment.2  For the last ten years, 
Landrum has tried to get courts to consider his lawyer’s failings at his 
murder trial nearly three decades ago.3  His lawyer thought that the hearsay 
rule barred the testimony of a man who would have told the jurors that the 
fourteen-year-old co-defendant, and not Landrum, actually slit White’s 
throat.4 
Yet, because of Landrum’s failure to inform the court of his attorney’s 
inadequate representation in his initial appeals, he was denied the 
opportunity to challenge his lawyer’s negligence.5  However, a recent U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling might mean that defendants6 like Landrum, who 
otherwise face lengthy prison sentences or the death penalty, can be heard. 
The debate turns on which claims a defendant can raise in a writ of 
habeas corpus.  Among the protections for individual liberty in the original 
Constitution, habeas petitions ask federal courts to decide if a defendant’s 
detention is unlawful.7  Despite the writ’s function as a defendant’s final 
appeal, “[t]he federal court does not (formally) second-guess the state 
courts that conducted the criminal trial,” but instead “focuses exclusively on 
the legal validity of the prisoner’s current detention.”8 
Generally, state defendants are barred from raising new, unheard claims 
in federal habeas petitions.9  This is known as the doctrine of procedural 
default, and it reinforces the state’s supremacy in forfeiting claims that are 
not advanced “at the time and in the manner prescribed by state law.”10 
	
 1. See Landrum v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 905, 912 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 2. Id. at 909. 
 3. Id. at 914; see also State v. Landrum, 720 N.E.2d 524 (Ohio 1999). 
 4. Landrum, 625 F.3d at 915.  Courts later ruled that the testimony clearly would have 
been permitted under Ohio law. Id. 
 5. Id. at 914, 919. 
 6. For ease and clarity, this Note will refer to habeas petitioners as defendants. 
 7. See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS:  HABEAS CORPUS 18, 107 (2d ed. 2010); 
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (Supp. III 2010) (“The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a 
circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 
that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States.”).  Federal prisoners can also seek habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006).  A 
federal court’s power to grant a writ of habeas corpus is vested in § 2241(a), which provides, 
in pertinent part, “Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice 
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” Id. 
 8. YACKLE, supra note 7, at 84–85. 
 9. See generally RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 26.1 (6th ed. 2011).  This is only one of many procedural 
barriers that defendants face in making habeas claims, and Hertz and Liebman note that 
“[o]ver the course of the past three decades, the Supreme Court—with the concurrence of 
Congress in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)—has 
erected elaborate procedural obstacles to federal habeas corpus review.” Id. § 22.1. 
 10. YACKLE, supra note 7, at 263–64. 
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Intended to advance the central tenets of federalism and finality, this 
doctrine provides state criminal courts with the opportunity to fully and 
fairly vet each allegation before examination by a federal court.11  This 
includes even those claims that allege violations of individual liberties, 
including the right to effective counsel.12  The strict application of the 
procedural default doctrine disproportionately affects claims of ineffective 
assistance,13 and effective counsel is commonly considered one of the most 
important constitutional protections for criminal defendants.14 
When faced with this reality in Martinez v. Ryan,15 the Supreme Court 
sought to balance the interests of federalism and finality advanced by 
procedural default with a defendant’s ability to assert a failure of his or her 
constitutional right to effective counsel.  The Court laid out a new equitable 
rule excusing a defendant’s failure to claim ineffective assistance of counsel 
and allowing federal courts to bypass the doctrine of procedural default and 
hear the underlying claim.16  Under the Martinez exception, a defendant can 
raise a new claim in two situations:  when he or she can plausibly allege two 
ineffective attorneys—trial counsel and postconviction counsel (for failing 
to recognize and raise the trial counsel’s inadequacies) or ineffective trial 
counsel followed by no counsel at the postconviction level.17  However, the 
Court limited the Martinez exception to states that require that ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims be made in postconviction proceedings, as 
opposed to states that allow such claims to proceed on direct appeal or in 
postconviction proceedings.18  Postconviction review19—also known as 
collateral review or collateral attack—is distinguished from a direct appeal, 
because it is a discretionary appeal that is generally sought after a direct 
appeal is unsuccessful.20 
	
 11. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.1. 
 12. For a general look at how often federal courts rely on procedural default to dismiss 
claims, see NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT:  HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS 48 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/219559.pdf (showing that in 42.2 percent of 368 capital cases, at least one claim was 
barred by procedural default, and in 16 percent of those cases defendants successfully 
surpassed the procedural default bar or the judge chose to reach the claim on the merits 
anyway; in 13.3 percent of 1,986 noncapital cases, at least one claim was barred by default, 
and in only 1.7 percent of those cases defendants surpassed that bar). 
 13. See infra Part I.D. 
 14. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (“[A defendant] requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.  Without it, though he 
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish 
his innocence.”). 
 15. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
 16. Id. at 1320. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. at 1320–21. 
 19. The terms postconviction and collateral review will be used interchangeably in this 
Note. 
 20. DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK 
§ 1:2 (2013–14). 
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Yet, soon after its holding, the Court qualified the Martinez exception in 
Trevino v. Thaler.21  In that case, the Court found that the Martinez 
exception applies—regardless of where ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims can be raised—if the state’s appellate system does not provide 
defendants with “a meaningful opportunity” to allege that their counsel was 
inadequate.22 
This qualification has created more questions than answers.23  As Chief 
Justice Roberts points out in his dissenting opinion in Trevino:  “We are not 
told, for example, how meaningful is meaningful enough, how 
meaningfulness is to be measured . . . .”24 
Now, lower federal courts—once again, seeking to strike the correct 
balance—must make sense of the “meaningful opportunity” standard as 
defendants ask them to reconsider new ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims that were initially barred by procedural default. 
Because habeas corpus preserves one of the most important human 
rights—a person’s liberty25—this question speaks to a fundamental struggle 
within the American justice system.  There are powerful arguments for an 
answer that promotes federalism or one that respects individual liberties. 
Habeas petitions are one of the rare instances when federal courts can 
step in and overturn state criminal convictions that are no longer subject to 
review.26  A breach of the constitutionally dictated bounds of federalism 
disrespects the sanctity of state court judgments.27  Due to concerns about 
efficiency and fairness, the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to 
mostly defer to the states on constitutional issues in state criminal cases, 
and Congress has codified that principle in the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 199628 (AEDPA). 
Furthermore, finality in criminal convictions is necessary to conserve 
judicial resources, to avoid “routinely second-guessing” state judges, and to 
prevent the retrial of a defendant after “evidence is lost and memories have 
faded.”29  On a deeper level, as one scholar has noted, finality is necessary 
to achieve the basic aims of the criminal justice system: 
	
 21. 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013). 
 22. Id. at 1921. 
 23. See, e.g., Henness v. Bagley, No. 2:01-CV-043, 2013 WL 4017643, at *11 (S.D. 
Ohio Aug. 6, 2013) (“Because the law on ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is 
in its infancy, reasonable jurists could disagree on whether this Court has applied the correct 
standard . . . .”); see also infra Part III (discussing how Illinois, Ohio, Tennessee and 
Arkansas have attempted to define meaningful opportunity). 
 24. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1923 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 25. DAVID CLARK & GERARD MCCOY, THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHT:  HABEAS 
CORPUS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 3 n.17 (2000). 
 26. See YACKLE, supra note 7, at 88–89 (noting that the existence of habeas is “intensely 
controversial”); Mary Dewey, Comment, Martinez v. Ryan:  A Shift Toward Broadening 
Access to Federal Habeas Corpus, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 269, 274 (2012). 
 27. See Dewey, supra note 26, at 274. 
 28. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214; see also Dewey, supra note 26, at 274. 
 29. See Dewey, supra note 26, at 274. 
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Surely it is essential to the educational and deterrent functions of the 
criminal law that we be able to say that one violating that law will swiftly 
and certainly become subject to punishment, just punishment.  Yet this 
threat may be undermined if at the same time we so define the processes 
leading to just punishment that it can really never be finally imposed at all 
. . . .  The idea of just condemnation lies at the heart of the criminal law, 
and we should not lightly create processes which implicitly belie its 
possibility.30 
Yet, because of the gravity of criminal convictions and the penalty of 
imprisonment that can attach, finality “raises acute tensions in our 
society”31—especially when finality is achieved by refusing to hear claims 
that a defendant’s trial was flawed because of his or her inadequate 
attorney.  Every person facing criminal judgment in a court of law has the 
right to effective trial counsel.32  This right has been described as the 
“foundation for our adversary system.”33  As the Court explained in Gideon 
v. Wainwright,34 “The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition 
that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not . . . 
be done.”35  There is good reason why this right is considered to be the 
most important constitutional protection for criminal defendants:  it is the 
most fundamental check on unfairness, it protects the innocent, and it is 
“the primary point of entry for most other constitutional protections.”36  As 
Chief Justice Warren wrote just a year before his Court made its landmark 
ruling in Gideon: 
When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty or 
property, it takes its most awesome steps.  No general respect for, nor 
adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected without judicial 
recognition of the paramount need for prompt, eminently fair and sober 
criminal law procedures.  The methods we employ in the enforcement of 
our criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which the quality 
of our civilization may be judged.37 
How do courts craft a rule that grants defendants the ability to question 
the actions of the person charged with their defense while still preserving 
federalism and finality?  If the courts allow for exceptions to the hard-edged 
procedural default doctrine, how can those exceptions operate without 
destroying the system’s very foundation? 
	
 30. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 (1963). 
 31. Id. at 441. 
 32. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
 33. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012). 
 34. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 35. Id. at 343 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)) (internal quotation 
mark omitted). 
 36. Justin F. Marceau, Gideon’s Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482, 2487 (2013).  For 
example, effective trial counsel may preserve claims to be considered on appeal. See, e.g., 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b). 
 37. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962). 
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For Lawrence Landrum, awaiting his death sentence in Ohio, this 
determination could mean the difference between life and a lethal injection.  
Now, an Ohio magistrate judge has recommended that the Sixth Circuit 
reconsider its ruling in light of Martinez.38  If the Sixth Circuit finds that 
Ohio’s appellate framework does not offer a meaningful opportunity to 
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, 
Landrum, and others like him, may have the opportunity to convince a 
federal court to consider their trial counsel’s mistakes.  If the Sixth Circuit 
finds that defendants are provided a meaningful opportunity, then 
Landrum’s claim will go unheard. 
This Note explores how courts have attempted to interpret this new 
meaningful opportunity standard and argues for consistent analysis and 
application among the states despite their unique appellate frameworks.  
Part I explains writs of habeas corpus, the doctrine of procedural default, 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and why procedural default uniquely 
impacts ineffective assistance claims.  Part II describes the Martinez 
exception and the Court’s expansion of the exception in Trevino.  Part III 
examines the attempts of lower federal courts in Illinois, Ohio, Tennessee, 
and Arkansas to parse the meaningful opportunity standard and determine 
its application to state defendants.  Part IV presents several factors that 
lower courts should consider when deciding whether the states in which 
they sit offer a meaningful opportunity, and it evaluates the efforts of the 
four lower federal courts that have already weighed in.  This Part also 
argues that the key to meaningful opportunity on direct appeal is the 
automatic provision of new counsel.  Although courts must also consider 
other factors in the state appellate framework, without new counsel, states 
cannot fulfill the meaningful opportunity standard. 
I.  THE PROCEDURAL DEFAULT OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
CLAIMS IN HABEAS PETITIONS 
This Part examines the writ of habeas corpus, the doctrines of procedural 
default and ineffective assistance of counsel, and how those standards 
interact in habeas petitions.  Part I.A briefly describes how writs of habeas 
corpus function within the criminal justice system.  Part I.B explains the 
rule of procedural default, why federal courts abide by it, and the exceptions 
the Supreme Court has built in.  Part I.C traces the development of the 
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Part I.D describes the unique 
problems that procedural default can pose for ineffective assistance claims, 
specifically because of the nature of the claim, and the common tactic of 
litigating these claims in postconviction proceedings as opposed to on direct 
appeal.  Prior to Martinez, the postconviction forum was particularly unkind 
to ineffective assistance claims, because there is no requirement for 
effective counsel, and thus no remedy for the actions of inadequate counsel. 
	
 38. See Landrum v. Anderson, No. 1:96-CV-641, 2013 WL 5423815, at *10 (S.D. Ohio 
Sept. 26, 2013).  Trevino “strengthens this Court’s conclusion . . . that the Martinez 
exception reaches Ohio cases.” Id. at *2. 
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A.  Writs of Habeas Corpus 
Writs of habeas corpus ask federal courts to consider if a person’s 
detention is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States.”39  Latin for “you have the body,” habeas corpus is known as 
the “mechanism for challenging the most egregious breaches of individual 
liberty, when citizens are awakened from sleep, dragged off into the night, 
and held without explanation.”40  Part of its fame may be traced to its 
“continuing role in conflicts,” including its centrality during wartime and 
other emergencies, and its use by those avoiding deportation, seeking 
refuge, or staying a death sentence.41 
Considered a suit in the nature of a civil action, habeas petitions are a 
“summary remedy” to restore liberty to one illegally held in custody.42  In 
criminal cases contesting detention, a prisoner initiates a civil lawsuit 
naming a custodian (usually the warden) and attempts to show the custodian 
has no lawful basis for the prisoner’s deprivation of liberty.43  The federal 
courts focus on the validity of the prisoner’s detention, rather than the 
underlying issue of guilt or innocence.44  To do this, federal courts examine 
the federal issues that the state courts determined during a petitioner’s trial 
and prior appeals.45  Common habeas corpus claims include Sixth 
Amendment claims of failure to provide appointed counsel and ineffective 
assistance of counsel, Fifth Amendment claims concerning statements 
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,46 prosecutorial misconduct, 
significant judicial error, and claims of insufficient evidence.47  Relief for 
violations of federal law by the state will be granted only if the violation is 
“inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure” or rises to 
the level of a “fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete 
miscarriage of justice.”48 
Habeas petitions are one of the rare instances where federal courts can 
step in and review rulings in state court that are no longer subject to 
review.49  Habeas petitions buck the traditional balance of federalism and 
	
 39. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (Supp. III 2010). 
 40. See YACKLE, supra note 7, at 1. 
 41. CLARK & MCCOY, supra note 25, at 1. 
 42. See generally Simmons v. Ga. Iron & Coal Co., 43 S.E. 780, 781 (Ga. 1903). 
 43. See YACKLE, supra note 7, at 84. 
 44. See id. at 116.  A defendant claiming actual innocence is an exception. See id. 
 45. Id. at 115. 
 46. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 47. Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 931, 935–38 
(2011). 
 48. Id. at 933–34 (quoting Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 348 (1994)); see, e.g., Ditch v. 
Grace, 479 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the claim that the petitioner was 
denied counsel at preliminary hearing was not cognizable because it did not show 
fundamental defects); Sanna v. Dipaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
claim of a confusing jury instruction was not cognizable because it did not betray a 
fundamental principle of justice); Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d 604, 607 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that the claim that the state violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act was 
not cognizable because the error was not a fundamental defect). 
 49. See YACKLE, supra note 7, at 88–89. 
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function separately from entrenched legal cornerstones like finality and res 
judicata.50  For in habeas writs, all other considerations must be subordinate 
to life and liberty.51  Consequently, habeas corpus has been referred to as 
the most important human right.52 
B.  The Doctrine of Procedural Default 
The rule for defendants to remember when deciding which claims to raise 
on appeal can be deceptively simple:  “Use it or lose it.”53  A defendant 
must raise allegations of constitutional errors at the time or in the manner 
prescribed by the state, or that defendant may lose the chance to have that 
claim heard first by state courts, and then again by federal courts in a 
habeas petition.54  In other words, when state courts refuse to address a 
claim on the merits because the defendant did not obey existing state 
procedures in making that claim, federal courts will also refuse to reach the 
merits.55  The doctrine of procedural default is borne of “respect for 
finality, comity, and the orderly administration of justice.”56  It allows a 
state to enforce its own laws with the knowledge that those laws will be 
duly respected by the federal courts.57  Further, it prevents attempts to 
circumvent jurisdictional limits of the appellate process.58  Part I.B.1 sets 
out the five requirements that must be met for a claim to be barred by 
	
 50. BADSHAH K. MIAN, AMERICAN HABEAS CORPUS:  LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 92 
(1947). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See CLARK & MCCOY, supra note 25, at 3 n.17. 
 53. See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.1 (discussing the procedural 
default doctrine).  This simplification also satisfies the doctrine of exhaustion, which 
requires defendants to generally exhaust all state court avenues of relief prior to petitioning 
for a writ of habeas corpus. See Hugh Mundy, Rid of Habeas Corpus? How Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Has Endangered Access to the Writ of Habeas Corpus and What the 
Supreme Court Can Do in Maples and Martinez To Restore It, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 
196 (2011).  However, this rule clashes head-on with the new standards put into place under 
AEDPA, which, among other things, restricts a defendant’s ability to file successive habeas 
petitions by requiring that claims raised in a previous petition must be dismissed unless they 
rely on a new retroactive rule or new facts have been discovered that could not have been 
unearthed before. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006).  It appears that AEDPA did not affect the 
number of claims that were defaulted, and the doctrine of procedural default appears to be 
applied by district courts at roughly the same rate as it was before AEDPA. See KING ET AL., 
supra note 12, at 58.  This Note focuses on the procedurally defaulted claims.  For more 
information on other procedural barriers, see generally John H. Blume, AEDPA:  The 
“Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 270–74 (2006). 
 54. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85–86 (1977) (finding that procedural default 
occurred because the petitioner failed to make a timely objection under the state 
contemporaneous objection rule to the admission of inculpatory statements); see also Dretke 
v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388 (2004) (reaffirming the procedural default rule and stating that 
federal courts will not ordinarily “entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim” in 
a habeas petition). 
 55. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002). 
 56. Dretke, 541 U.S. at 388. 
 57. See Lee, 534 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 
501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991)). 
 58. See id. 
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procedural default.  Part I.B.2 looks to the exceptions that the courts have 
developed that allow defendants to surmount a procedural default. 
1.  The Five Requirements for Procedural Default 
Five requirements must be satisfied for a federal court to avoid hearing a 
claim under the doctrine of procedural default.59  However, applying these 
five requirements is far from simple.60  Jeffries and Stuntz called it a 
doctrine constructed piecemeal—“each part more readily explained by the 
circumstances of its addition than by its relation to a coherent whole.”61  
They illustrated this through the plight of an imaginary defendant: 
Imagine a defendant whose lawyer fails to move to suppress an arguably 
involuntary confession until the beginning of the trial.  The state has a 
rule requiring that such motions be made before trial but allow[s] trial 
courts to consider late motions on a discretionary basis.  The trial judge 
decides that the motion should not be heard, both because there is no 
excuse for the untimeliness and because, in any event, ‘the confession 
plainly appears to be voluntary.’  After conviction and appeal, the 
defendant seeks federal habeas corpus . . . to have the habeas court 
determine the voluntariness of his confession . . . .”62 
First, the state must rule, in a timely manner, that the defendant’s claim is 
barred by procedural default.63  Put differently, the state must apprise the 
federal courts of the state procedural bar in order for the federal courts to 
respect it.64  If state officials fail to do so, the federal courts can reach the 
merits of the claim.65  In Jeffries and Stuntz’s example, the trial judge’s 
ruling was a timely response to the defendant’s motion to suppress. 
Second, the state court must have relied on a clearly applicable state 
procedural rule to deny relief—in other words, the rule must be supported 
by state law, firmly established, and the case at hand must not qualify as a 
recognized exception.66  To do this, the court must ask whether the rule is 
supported by state law, and whether it has regularly been applied to similar 
cases.67  For the purpose of the above example, one can assume that the 
judge ruled appropriately, because a greater context of the rules and 
procedures within the imaginary state is necessary to conclude otherwise. 
Third, the defendant must have actually violated the state rule.68  Here, 
by delaying his motion to suppress his statement to police, the defendant 
	
 59. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.2. 
 60. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural 
Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 679 (1990). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 688. 
 63. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.2. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle:  Procedural Default, Habeas 
Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1114 
(1999). 
 68. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.2. 
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violated the state rule requiring him to bring such motions before the start 
of trial. 
Fourth, the procedural violation must provide an adequate and 
independent state ground for denying a petitioner’s federal constitutional 
claim.69  Thus, the state procedural rule must be both “adequate” to support 
the state court judgment and “independent” of federal law.70  If the state 
rule allows a “reasonable opportunity” for the defendant to have otherwise 
raised his suppression claim, the courts may find the state rule adequate.71  
To be independent of federal law, the state rule must not “depend[] in some 
way upon federal law.”72  Both questions are within the purview of federal 
courts.73 
Finally, the last state court to rule on the claim must have clearly and 
unambiguously rejected it because of the procedural violation without 
reaching the merits.74  If the state court addressed the merits, the federal 
court should as well.75  In Jeffries and Stuntz’s example, it is unclear if the 
state court reached the merits.  The trial judge reached the merits of the 
claim but as an afterthought, likely seeking to rely, first and foremost, on 
the procedural default.  However, as long as the last court to rule “clearly 
and expressly” stated it chose to rely on the procedural default, the default 
can apply to bar the defendant from raising a new claim in a habeas 
petition.76  In the example, the judge plainly gave the doctrine of default as 
the reason for dismissing the motion, so the judge’s ruling seems to satisfy 
the final prong. 
If all five requirements are satisfied, the court must next examine whether 
the defendant qualifies for either of the two exceptions that might excuse 
the procedural default.77 
	
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465–66 (2009) (noting that while federal courts will 
not review federal claims in a habeas petition when the state court’s decision rests upon 
independent and adequate grounds, it is within the federal courts’ role to determine whether 
those grounds are actually independent and adequate). 
 74. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.2. 
 75. See Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 60, at 689. 
 76. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (“Faced with a common problem, we adopt 
a common solution:  a procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on 
either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case 
‘clearly and expressly’ states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” (quoting 
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985))). 
 77. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.3.  The defendant has to show either that 
(1) there was “cause,” or reason, for the default, and that he or she was “prejudiced” by it, or 
(2) the case falls within a category of cases the Supreme Court has denominated 
“fundamental miscarriages of justice.” Id.  For further discussion of the first exception, see 
infra Part I.B.2. 
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2.  The Exception:  Cause and Prejudice 
If the five requirements for a procedural default are met, there are only 
two ways a defendant can surmount it.78  First, a defendant can attempt to 
demonstrate there was a “miscarriage of justice,” in order for federal courts 
to adjudicate his claim on the merits.79  Second, a defendant can attempt to 
show cause and prejudice, with “cause” constituting a reason for failing to 
comply with the state procedural rule, and “prejudice” being the actual 
disadvantage the defendant suffered.80  If a defendant can show both cause 
and prejudice, then the federal court will excuse the procedural default in 
state court and consider the merits of the underlying constitutional claim.81 
The Supreme Court first applied the cause-and-prejudice doctrine to 
habeas cases in 1977,82 but the court didn’t define cause in that context for 
nearly another decade.83  The Court held that to meet the standard for cause, 
a defendant must show that “some objective factor external to the defense 
impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.”84   
To explain “external” and “objective factors,” it is useful to understand why 
the procedural default doctrine is in place.85 
While the procedural default rule is rooted in federalism, it is also 
designed to discourage defendants and their lawyers from “sandbagging” 
the court86—in other words, to stop defendants from abusing the system by 
deciding to raise some claims on state appeal but saving others for federal 
review in habeas petitions.87  Yet, the rule is also meant to ensure 
defendants have a forum in which they can present their claims fairly and 
meaningfully because the state law barring them has to be “adequate and 
independent.”88 
When a default is attributable to an objective factor that is external to the 
defense, both those concerns are satisfied.89  Because it is external to the 
defense, the courts are satisfied the default was not “the result of a strategic, 
tactical, or sandbagging choice” by the defendant.90  Because it is an 
	
 78. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.3. 
 79. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also Rutherford v. Crosby, 
385 F.3d 1300, 1318 (11th Cir. 2004).  Courts have found that a demonstration of “actual 
innocence” fits within the narrow miscarriage of justice exception. See Eve Brensike Primus, 
Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan:  Focusing on the Adequacy of State 
Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2609 (2013); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 
(1986) (stating that procedural default would be excused, even in the absence of cause, when 
“a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 
innocent”). 
 80. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.3. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90–91 (1977). 
 83. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.3. 
 84. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 
 85. See supra Part I.A.1; see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.3. 
 86. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 492. 
 87. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.3. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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objective factor, the courts can question whether the defendant’s ability to 
raise the claim in the state courts was fair and meaningful.91 
Courts have found that cause to excuse a procedural default is satisfied in 
several instances, such as when counsel did not know—and could not have 
learned with reasonable diligence—the basis for a defaulted claim before 
the time to raise it expired,92 when state action made compliance 
“impracticable,”93 or when counsel failed to raise the claim despite the 
wishes of his client.94 
But if finding an external, objective reason to constitute cause seems 
difficult, the second part of the test, explaining why a defendant has been 
prejudiced, is even more challenging.95  The Supreme Court has not 
provided an exact definition of prejudice,96 but has concluded that it 
generally means an “actual and substantial disadvantage” in the specific 
case at hand.97 
To understand how prejudice is such a case-specific analysis, consider 
two Supreme Court cases that involved similar fact patterns:  Strickler v. 
Greene98 and Banks v. Dretke.99  In both cases, the defendants failed to 
raise a motion in their state court postconviction proceeding, but sought to 
raise it in a habeas corpus petition.100  They claimed state prosecutors 
committed a Brady violation101 by withholding evidence that should have 
been turned over to the defense.102  In both cases, the Supreme Court found 
that the exculpatory evidence withheld satisfied the procedural default 
doctrine’s cause requirement because the suppression of material evidence 
was an objective factor external to the defense.103  But the Court ruled 
	
 91. See id. 
 92. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283, 289 (1999) (acknowledging that a 
prosecutor’s suppression of documents favorable to the defense “impeded trial counsel’s 
access to the factual basis for making a Brady claim” and also deterred the state 
postconviction counsel from raising the claim in state postconviction proceedings). 
 93. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691–98 (2004) (“[A] petitioner shows ‘cause’ 
when the reason for his failure to develop facts in state-court proceedings was the State’s 
suppression of the relevant evidence . . . .”). 
 94. See Clay v. Dir., Juvenile Div., Dep’t of Corr., 749 F.2d 427, 430–31 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
 95. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.3. 
 96. See id.; see also Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 221 (1988) (observing that the 
Court’s “decisions . . . have not attempted to establish conclusively the contours of the 
‘cause’-and-‘prejudice’ standard,” but instead have left “open ‘for resolution in future 
decisions the precise definition of the . . . standard’” (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 
72, 87 (1977))). 
 97. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 9, § 26.3. 
 98. 527 U.S. 263 (1999). 
 99. 540 U.S. 668 (2004). 
 100. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 682–84; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 265. 
 101. A Brady violation occurs when the prosecution fails to turn over evidence favorable 
to the defendant. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  This violates “due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith 
or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. 
 102. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 690; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 266. 
 103. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 698; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289. 
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differently in each case as to whether it satisfied the requirement of 
prejudice.104  In Banks, the Court explained the difference: 
Regarding “prejudice,” the contrast between Strickler and Banks’s case is 
marked.  The witness whose impeachment was at issue in Strickler gave 
testimony that was . . . hardly significant . . . .  Other evidence in the 
record, the Court found, provided strong support for the conviction even if 
the witness’ testimony had been excluded entirely:  Unlike the Banks 
prosecution, in Strickler, “considerable forensic and other physical 
evidence link[ed] [the defendant] to the crime” and supported the capital 
murder conviction . . . .  In contrast, Farr’s testimony was the centerpiece 
of Banks’s prosecution’s penalty-phase case.105 
Thus, to surmount a procedural default, not only does a defendant have to 
prove cause, but a defendant must also show how that cause has prejudiced 
the fairness of the guilt or sentencing phase of the trial in some substantial 
or material way.106 
C.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
The most commonly asserted claim in federal habeas petitions is 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in state court.107  One reason is 
because ineffective assistance is often a precondition for raising claims that 
the courts could not otherwise decide either because of waiver or procedural 
default.108  Yet few of these claims actually succeed—some because they 
are frivolous, some because of the high threshold required to prove 
constitutionally significant ineffective assistance, and some due to a 
combination of frivolity and the high threshold.109  Part I.C.1 explains the 
	
 104. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 703; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296. 
 105. Banks, 540 U.S. at 700–01 (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting 
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 295). 
 106. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (“The question is not whether the 
defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but 
whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict 
worthy of confidence.”). 
 107. See KING ET AL., supra note 12, at 28 (showing that 81 percent of habeas petitions in 
capital cases and 50.4 percent of those in noncapital cases raised the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel); see also VICTOR E. FLANGO, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS 
CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 45–47 (1994), available at 
http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/criminal/id/0 (showing that 41 
percent of state habeas petitions and 45 percent of federal habeas petitions raise the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective 
Assistance:  The Awakening of Cronic’s Call To Presume Prejudice from Representational 
Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 832 n.28 (2003) (citing ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. 
DALEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
REVIEW:  CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 14 (1995)). 
 108. See Marceau, supra note 36, at 2487 (noting that effective assistance is the “primary 
point of entry for most other constitutional protections”). 
 109. Id. at 2482 (stating that ineffectiveness requires “a fact-specific showing of deficient 
performance and prejudice that is much more difficult to prove than a freestanding 
constitutional error,” especially when “the prisoner, most likely litigating pro se, [must] 
overcome the rationalizations and post hoc strategic justifications of his former defense 
lawyer who is now working with the state prosecutors so as to thwart this claim and avoid an 
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constitutional right to effective counsel.  Part I.C.2 discusses the standard 
for ineffective assistance of counsel, as explained in Strickland v. 
Washington.110 
1.  The Constitutional Right to Effective Counsel 
The right to counsel is grounded in the Sixth Amendment, which states, 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”111  In Gideon v. Wainwright,112 
a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court “laid the foundation for modern 
right-to-counsel jurisprudence.”113  Gideon required states to provide 
lawyers to all indigent defendants charged with a felony.114  In an opinion 
released the same day, the Court also held that this right continues through 
a defendant’s first direct appeal.115  Seven years after Gideon, the Supreme 
Court further interpreted assistance of counsel to mean effective assistance 
of counsel at trial and appeal.116  However, despite finding that lawyers are 
essential to the justice system, the Court did not outline the basic elements 
of what constitutes effective assistance.117 
2.  Strickland v. Washington:  The Standard for Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel 
Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuit courts 
formulated their own tests for what qualified as ineffective assistance of 
counsel.118  Finally, in 1984, more than two decades after the decision in 
Gideon, the Supreme Court laid out a framework for what constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington. 
In Strickland, the defendant went on a ten-day crime spree, racking up an 
indictment that included three counts of first-degree murder, as well as 
robbery, kidnapping for ransom, breaking and entering, assault, attempted 
murder, and conspiracy to commit murder.119  The defendant confessed, 
and at his sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced him to death.120  The 
defendant later brought an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on 
his counsel’s failure to move for a continuance, request a psychiatric report, 
	
ethical rebuke by the state bar”). See generally JOHN M. BURKOFF & NANCY M. BURKOFF, 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (2013). 
 110. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 111. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 112. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 113. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 107, at 836. 
 114. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
 115. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (“For there can be no equal justice 
where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys ‘depends on the amount of money he has.’” 
(quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956))). 
 116. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[D]efendants cannot 
be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel . . . .”). 
 117. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 107, at 836. 
 118. Id. at 836–37. 
 119. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671–72. 
 120. Id. at 672–75. 
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investigate or present character witnesses, seek a presentence investigation 
report, present meaningful arguments to the judge, or cross-examine 
medical experts.121 
The Court held that even though defense counsel “understandably felt 
hopeless,”122 counsel’s belief that the defendant’s confession and remorse 
were enough to save him from the death penalty was reasonable.123  
Furthermore, the Court noted, counsel had moved to exclude specific 
harmful evidence.124  After reiterating that the “right to counsel is the right 
to the effective assistance of counsel,”125 the Court laid out its two-part 
analysis for evaluating ineffectiveness claims:  a defendant must show both 
(1) that his counsel performed deficiently, and (2) that his performance 
actually prejudiced the defendant.126 
To show deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate that his 
attorney “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”127  The 
Court allowed lower courts to be “highly deferential”128 to lawyers’ 
strategic choices, even acknowledging a presumption that a lawyer's 
performance is “within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.”129 
Prejudice, however, requires a showing that “counsel’s errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable.”130  The Court permitted lower courts to end the inquiry when 
faced with an absence of prejudice alone.131  This “facilitates the efficient 
processing of ineffectiveness claims,” however it is based on “the 
assumption that prejudice flowing from an attorney’s errors will be 
detectable from the appellate record.”132 
Although the Strickland test remains a high bar, courts have found 
ineffectiveness when defense counsel conducted no pretrial discovery,133 
failed to object to testimony that was obviously a violation of a defendant’s 
Confrontation Clause rights,134 or failed to interview alibi witnesses, 
eyewitnesses, and a codefendant who exonerated the defendant.135 
	
 121. Id. at 675–78. 
 122. Id. at 699. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 673. 
 125. Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n.14 (1970)). 
 126. Id. at 687 (“Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the 
conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders 
the result unreliable.”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 689. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 687. 
 131. Id. at 697. 
 132. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 107, at 840. 
 133. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986). 
 134. See Mason v. Scully, 16 F.3d 38, 44–45 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 135. See Bryant v. Scott, 28 F.3d 1411, 1418 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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D.  Procedural Default and Ineffective Assistance 
The constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel attaches in 
pretrial proceedings136 and extends through the first appeal,137 so a 
defendant can claim his or her counsel was ineffective in any action or 
omission during that time.  Perhaps because of the wide window, 
ineffective assistance of counsel may be the most common ground for all 
appeals.138  Indeed, ineffective assistance is the most common claim in 
habeas petitions.139  A 2007 survey showed that 81 percent of habeas 
petitions in capital cases and 50.4 percent of those in noncapital cases raised 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.140  The next most frequent claim 
is false, lost, or undisclosed evidence, raised in 43.1 percent of capital cases 
and about 13 percent of noncapital cases.141 
Yet, the doctrine of procedural default is particularly unkind to 
ineffective assistance claims for three reasons discussed in the following 
sections.  First, the claim itself is difficult to prove without the time and 
resources to investigate or an effective attorney to undertake that 
investigation.142  Second, most states push these claims to collateral review, 
where defendants do not have a constitutional right to counsel, much less 
effective counsel.143  Third, prior to 2012, the ineffectiveness of 
postconviction counsel could not excuse a default under the cause-and-
prejudice standard.144 
1.  The Nature of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
Ineffective assistance of counsel is usually a losing claim.145  A 2007 
survey that reviewed 368 capital cases applying for habeas relief found that 
of the thirty-three awarded relief, only five were because of an attorney’s 
ineffective assistance.146  When the defendant was not facing a capital 
crime, courts granted even fewer ineffective assistance claims.147  Of the 
2,384 noncapital cases in the random sample, with seven being given relief, 
only one was because of ineffective assistance.148 
	
 136. See BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 109, § 1:1. 
 137. Id. § 9:1. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 140. See KING ET AL., supra note 12, at 28–31, 64. 
 141. Id. at 64. 
 142. See infra Part I.D.1. 
 143. See infra Part I.D.2. 
 144. See infra Part I.D.3. 
 145. See KING ET AL., supra note 12, at 51–52; see also BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 
109, § 1:2 (noting an analysis of 4,000 state and federal ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims between 1970 and 1983 found that only 3.9 percent resulted in a finding of ineffective 
assistance). 
 146. See KING ET AL., supra note 12, at 17, 51. 
 147. Id. at 52. 
 148. Id. 
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The reason for this is complicated.  Ineffective assistance claims are 
unlike most other claims raised on appeal.149  Asserting a trial attorney’s 
ineffectiveness nearly always requires development beyond the record at 
trial, because such claims are usually “predicated on what trial attorneys 
failed to do.”150  This requires “investigation and an understanding of trial 
strategy and legal arguments”151 within the abbreviated deadlines many 
states set for motions to expand the record in preparation for direct 
appeals.152  The Supreme Court has expressed skepticism that this is 
possible.153 
Others suggest it is because it is inherently difficult to meet constitutional 
standards for ineffectiveness.154  Supreme Court Justice Brennan once 
observed:  “It is accurate to assert that most courts, this one included, 
traditionally have resisted any realistic inquiry into the competency of trial 
counsel.”155  Others say the potential of post hoc judicial scrutiny could 
disrupt attorney-client relationships,156 even opening attorneys up to legal 
malpractice claims.157  Many more indicate that ineffectiveness could stem 
from the rising caseload and limited funding for defense organizations.158  
The current standards recognize that each attorney must make 
individualized, fact-specific strategic decisions, and any change to stricter 
standards could force a one-size-fits-all determination of tactics.159 
2.  The State Postconviction Forum 
The forum presents another hurdle for defendants who want to raise 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  First, in most states, appellate 
courts do not usually consider matters outside the record or matters that 
involve facts not in evidence.160  That role belongs to the trial court, as 
factfinder, since it involves “an assessment of the credibility of the 
testimony and that is clearly not [an appellate court’s] function.”161  For 
	
 149. See Primus, supra note 79, at 2609. 
 150. Id.  Even in those claims that are based on the record, courts usually find that direct 
testimony or an affidavit from former defense counsel are necessary in order for courts to 
decide if the trial attorney’s decision was a strategic one. See id. at 2609 n.17. 
 151. See id. at 2613. 
 152. See id. at 2622 (acknowledging that most states have deadlines of between five and 
thirty days from the date of conviction to expand the record and “there is not sufficient time” 
to hire new counsel, obtain a copy of the trial transcript, investigate the trial attorney’s 
performance, and draft a new motion). 
 153. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) (noting that deadlines “may not 
allow adequate time” to investigate ineffective assistance claims). 
 154. See BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 109, § 1:2 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72, 117 (1977)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. § 1:3. 
 157. See id. § 1:10. 
 158. See id. § 1:3. 
 159. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (“Representation is an art, and 
an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in 
another.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 734 (Pa. 2002). 
 161. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 645 A.2d 189, 198 (Pa. 1994)). 
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that reason, most courts defer claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel until collateral review, rather than initial direct appeal.162 
Collateral review—as opposed to direct review—is the other avenue in 
which a person convicted of a crime can obtain relief.163  Generally, 
collateral review is not sought until a direct appeal has proved unsuccessful 
or the time allotted to make a direct appeal has expired, although in some 
jurisdictions defendants may pursue both avenues simultaneously.164 
Each state provides for collateral review in one or more of its courts, but 
the particular remedies and procedures vary from state to state.165  In twelve 
states, the principal remedy is the writ of habeas corpus.166  In the District 
of Columbia and the remaining thirty-eight states, the principal remedy is a 
modern version of writ of error coram nobis created by statute or a 
judicially promulgated rule of the court.167  Every state, except for Texas, 
also provides one or more secondary postconviction remedies in addition to 
the principal postconviction system.168  State law instructs where the 
petition is filed:  either the convicting court, an independent trial court, a 
court in the jurisdiction where the defendant is incarcerated, or an appellate 
court.169 
Depending on the laws of the jurisdiction, a defendant may seek relief on 
collateral review claiming the conviction or sentence is invalid, was 
imposed in violation of his or her constitutional rights, or was based on 
grounds unrelated to the validity, such as a claim attacking the conditions of 
confinement.170  In all but three states, the defendant has the burden of 
proving his or her claims by a preponderance of the evidence standard.171  
	
 162. Id. at 734–36 (summarizing the practices of other jurisdictions and observing that the 
federal courts and the overwhelming majority of state courts refuse to hear ineffective 
assistance claims on direct appeal).  Even the Supreme Court encourages states to allow 
defendants to wait until collateral review. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–
05 (2003) (“In light of the way our system has developed, in most cases a motion brought 
[during collateral review] is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective 
assistance.  When an ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate 
counsel and the court must proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for the object of 
litigating or preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.”). 
 163. See WILKES, supra note 20, § 1:2. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  The postconviction systems in each state can be traced back to a modernization 
that occurred in the 1930s and 1940s in response to an expansion of due process rights for 
state criminal defendants. Id. § 2:5.  By the end of 1965, forty states had expanded the 
availability of postconviction remedies for defendants by case, statutory enactment, or rule 
of court. Id.  By 1989, the remaining ten states adopted, either by statute or rule of court, a 
modern remedy as the state’s new postconviction system. Id. 
 166. See id. § 1:3 (California, Connecticut, Georgia, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia). 
 167. Id.  Other secondary methods include the common law writ of coram nobis, the 
motion to correct illegal sentence, the motion to reduce sentence, the motion to correct 
clerical error, and the writ of mandamus, among others.  See id. 
 168. See id. § 1:2. 
 169. See id. § 1:3. 
 170. See id. § 1:2. 
 171. Id.  Alaska, Tennessee, and Wisconsin use a clear and convincing evidence standard. 
Id. 
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Generally, courts only grant relief on one of three grounds:  
(1) jurisdictional error, (2) constitutional error, or (3) a fundamental or 
egregious error.172  State courts have “broad, flexible powers to grant 
whatever postconviction relief is appropriate,” including releasing a 
defendant from custody, dismissing the charges, granting a retrial, 
resentencing, or allowing another direct appeal.173 
The problem with deferring ineffective assistance claims to collateral 
review is two fold.  Generally, postconviction remedies may not be used to 
relitigate claims, which were—or could have been—raised on direct 
appeal.174  Furthermore, on collateral attack, there is no constitutional right 
to counsel.175  Unlike in the initial direct appeal, providing postconviction 
counsel is left up to the states’ discretion.176  In Ross v. Moffitt,177 the 
Supreme Court noted that before postconviction proceedings take place, 
defendants’ claims have already been “presented by a lawyer and passed 
upon by an appellate court.”178  Thus, defendants have already had 
“meaningful access” to state court review.179 
Therefore, unless the state system provides counsel, indigent defendants 
must raise their claims pro se on collateral review.  This requires a 
defendant, who presumably has no training in criminal law and is probably 
incarcerated, to first reasonably recognize possible grounds for that claim 
without the help of an attorney, and then pursue the necessary extrarecord 
development, such as securing affidavits.180 
However, at present, twenty-eight states provide a statutory right to 
counsel for postconviction remedies.181  Fifteen more states also provide for 
	
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense:  Relocating 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 691 (2007). 
 175. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (finding the right to counsel 
“extends to the first appeal of right, and no further”); see also Murray v. Giarrantano, 492 
U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (denying the right to postconviction counsel in capital cases and noncapital 
cases because “[s]tate collateral proceedings are not constitutionally required as an adjunct to 
the state criminal proceedings and serve a different and more limited purpose than either the 
trial or appeal”). 
 176. See Mundy, supra note 53, at 206. 
 177. 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
 178. Id. at 614 (quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963)). 
 179. Id. at 615 (“At that stage he will have, at the very least, a transcript or other record of 
trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of 
error, and in many cases an opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case.  These 
materials, supplemented by whatever submission respondent may make pro se, would appear 
to provide the Supreme Court of North Carolina with an adequate basis for its decision to 
grant or deny review.”). 
 180. See Voigts, supra note 67, at 1104. 
 181. See WILKES, supra note 20, § 1:5.  Those twenty-eight states are Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Ten of those states—Alaska, Arizona, 
Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee—
provide for effective counsel.  Illinois provides for a “reasonable level of assistance.” Id. 
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postconviction counsel, but only in death penalty cases.182  Yet even 
providing counsel is not an automatic cure for deferring all ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims to postconviction review.  Some states 
dismiss pro se petitions before appointing counsel because they are either 
beyond the filing deadline or successive.183  In other states, such as 
Pennsylvania, appointed counsel may be able to withdraw after filing an 
Anders brief.184  Other states that claim to provide counsel only do so if a 
judge decides the case has merit or orders a hearing or discovery.185 
3.  The Coleman Effect:  Ineffective Postconviction Attorneys 
Did Not Constitute Cause 
If for the discussed reasons—lack of extrarecord development, no 
counsel, conflicted counsel, or ineffective postconviction counsel—
defendants do not raise an ineffective assistance claim in a postconviction 
proceeding, they will “run head-on” into the doctrine of procedural default 
in a later federal habeas proceeding.186  Then, defendants typically must 
show cause and prejudice for courts to hear the defaulted claim.187  
However, before 2012, the Supreme Court did not permit the actions of 
postconviction counsel to act as cause for failure to raise a claim for 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.188 
In Coleman v. Thompson,189 the defendant, Roger Coleman, was 
convicted of rape and murder in Virginia and sentenced to death.190  On 
collateral review, a state court considered and rejected all of Coleman’s 
claims.191  Coleman claimed that his counsel failed to investigate and 
introduce his alibi defense, failed to interview and effectively cross-
examine a jailhouse informant, and failed to rebut the prosecution’s forensic 
	
 182. See id. 
 183. Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 
2443 n.53 (2013).  King cites statutes that allow this practice in Alaska, Tennessee, Arizona, 
and New Jersey. Id. 
 184. When attorneys find only frivolous issues for appeal, they file an Anders brief to 
alert the court and request withdrawal. See id. at 2443–44 (citing Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738 (1967) (permitting attorneys to withdraw if they determine only frivolous issues for 
appeal)). 
 185. See King, supra note 183, at 2444–45.  In states that permit judges to decide when 
counsel is required, only a small portion of defendants actually receive counsel in 
postconviction proceedings. Id.  For example, King cites Mississippi court records between 
2008 and 2011 that show that counsel appeared in only 15 percent of cases. Id.  King cites 
statistics from Texas, over the same period, that show the proportion is even smaller—about 
10 to 12 percent of noncapital habeas petitioners receive counsel. Id. 
 186. See Primus, supra note 79, at 2609. 
 187. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the other exception—
fundamental miscarriage of justice—which courts have interpreted as a showing of actual 
innocence). 
 188. See Primus, supra note 79, at 2611. 
 189. 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
 190. Id. at 726–27. 
 191. Id. at 727. 
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expert.192  Coleman’s postconviction attorneys appealed the decision, but 
filed the notice of appeal three days late.193  The Virginia Supreme Court 
dismissed the entire appeal, finding the late filing was a procedural bar.194  
Coleman then petitioned for habeas relief in federal court.195  The district 
court ruled that Coleman’s late filing and resulting bar in state court 
similarly barred federal review of his claims.196  The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.197  Before the Supreme 
Court, Coleman argued, inter alia, that his postconviction counsel’s 
ineffectiveness—the late filing of his collateral appeal—constituted cause to 
excuse his defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.198 
However, the Court held that because there was no constitutional right to 
an attorney in a state postconviction proceeding, Coleman could not use his 
lawyer’s failings to excuse his default.199  Therefore, the late filing did not 
constitute cause.200  The majority opinion emphasized that “[i]n the absence 
of a constitutional violation, the petitioner bears the risk in federal habeas 
for all attorney errors made in the course of the representation.”201  This 
standard is starkly different on direct appeals, where defendants are 
guaranteed effective counsel by the Sixth Amendment, and anything less 
can excuse a default.202  Coleman had important implications for 
defendants leaving “state prisoners . . . without an important means of 
overcoming defaults in state postconviction to obtain review on the merits 
of federal claims in federal habeas.”203 
II.  A NEW EQUITABLE EXCEPTION:  MARTINEZ AND TREVINO 
This was the landscape defendants had to navigate when they sought to 
claim that their trial counsel was ineffective in a federal habeas petition 
prior to the Martinez decision.  If they could find enough evidence to make 
the claim at all, many defendants had “only the slimmest hope” to secure 
counsel or a hearing.204  That changed with Martinez v. Ryan.  In Martinez, 
the Supreme Court unexpectedly promulgated a new equitable rule that 
	
 192. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Coleman, 501 U.S. 722 (No. 89-7662), 1990 WL 
515096, at *3. 
 193. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727. 
 194. Id. at 727–28. 
 195. Id. at 728. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 729. 
 198. Id. at 752. 
 199. Id. (citing Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (noting that where there is no 
constitutional right to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance)); see also 
Giovanna Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473, 476 (2013) (“[N]o 
right to counsel, ergo, no right to the effective assistance of counsel.”). 
 200. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752–753. 
 201. Id. at 754. 
 202. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986) (holding that cause to overcome 
procedural default “ordinarily requires a showing of some external impediment preventing 
counsel from constructing or raising the claim”). 
 203. See Shay, supra note 199, at 477. 
 204. See King, supra note 183, at 2449. 
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already has proven significant for defendants whose ineffective assistance 
claims were defaulted.205  The rule allows ineffective postconviction 
counsel to act as cause to excuse a procedurally defaulted ineffective 
assistance claim if the defendant was required by state law to raise this 
claim in a postconviction proceeding.206  One question remained 
unanswered after Martinez, however:  what about states that only strongly 
recommended ineffective assistance claims be raised in postconviction 
proceedings, while technically allowing them on direct appeal?207  Did the 
Martinez exception apply to those states as well?208  The Court attempted to 
answer that question a year later in Trevino v. Thaler.  This Part discusses 
those two decisions, the effect they may have on ineffective assistance 
claims, and the question the Court has left for lower courts to resolve. 
A.  Martinez v. Ryan 
Luis Mariano Martinez was tried on two counts of sexual conduct with 
his stepdaughter, a minor under the age of fifteen.209  At trial, the 
prosecution introduced evidence of a videotaped interview with the victim, 
Martinez’s eleven-year-old stepdaughter, as well as her nightgown, which 
contained traces of Martinez’s DNA.210  As part of his defense, Martinez 
introduced evidence that his stepdaughter had recanted in a second 
videotaped interview.211  Her mother and grandmother also testified about 
her later recanting.212  In rebuttal, the prosecution put an expert on the 
stand, explaining that young victims often recant when they do not have 
their mother’s support.213  After considering the conflicting evidence, the 
jury convicted Martinez.214  He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 
life imprisonment without possibility of parole for thirty-five years.215 
On direct appeal, Martinez was barred from presenting evidence that his 
trial counsel was ineffective, because Arizona requires such a claim to be 
brought in a postconviction proceeding.216  Martinez also failed to raise the 
claim in his collateral proceeding, the appropriate forum.217  About a year 
and a half later, he attempted to rectify that, filing a second notice of 
postconviction relief in the Arizona trial court that claimed his trial counsel 
	
 205. See infra Part III.A. 
 206. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012). 
 207. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1914–15 (2013) (“We said that the holding 
applied where state procedural law said that ‘claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding.’  In this case Texas state law does 
not say ‘must.’ . . . We must now decide whether the Martinez exception applies in this 
procedural regime.” (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320)). 
 208. Id., 133 S. Ct. at 1914–15. 
 209. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1313. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 1314. 
 217. Id. 
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had been ineffective for failing to object to the state’s expert testimony or to 
call an expert witness in rebuttal.218  Martinez also faulted trial counsel for 
not pursuing an exculpatory explanation for the DNA on the nightgown.219  
The state court dismissed Martinez’s petition, in part because he failed to 
raise that claim in his first postconviction petition.220  The federal district 
court subsequently found the claim had been procedurally defaulted, and his 
postconviction attorney’s failure to raise the claim did not constitute cause 
because of the Court’s holding in Coleman.221  The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.222  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the 
question. 
With his case before the highest Court in the land, Martinez asked the 
justices to address the big constitutional question:  whether defendants have 
a constitutional right to effective counsel in initial postconviction 
proceedings where state law mandates that they raise certain claims in that 
forum.223  But the Court declined to answer, and instead acknowledged at 
oral argument224 that the real question was whether ineffective 
postconviction counsel may provide cause to overcome a procedural 
default, despite a conflicting holding in Coleman.225  The Court found it 
could in a seven-to-two opinion written by Justice Kennedy.226  
Specifically, the Court held that where a state requires ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel claims to be raised in postconviction proceedings, further 
inadequate assistance of postconviction counsel—or no counsel at all—may 
establish cause for a defendant’s procedural default of a substantial 
ineffective trial counsel claim.227 
The Court carved out this equitable exception because of the structure of 
Arizona’s postconviction system and the nature of the claim itself.  By 
requiring all ineffective assistance claims to be raised in postconviction 
proceedings, Arizona has made that proceeding “the equivalent of a 
prisoner’s direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.”228  To make 
a viable claim of ineffective assistance on collateral review, “a prisoner 
likely needs an effective attorney.”229  That is not guaranteed in 
	
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 1315. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id.; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-1001), 
2011 WL 398287, at *i (“Whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by 
state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 
but who has a state-law right to raise such a claim in a first post-conviction proceeding, has a 
federal constitutional right to effective assistance of first post-conviction counsel specifically 
with respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.”). 
 224. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-1001) 
(Breyer, J.) (“There is an issue about if you do give them counsel, then they have to be able 
to have an argument later that you did it ineffectively.”). 
 225. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. 
 226. Id. at 1320. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1317. 
 229. Id. 
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postconviction proceedings.230  Without effective counsel, and with the rule 
of procedural default lurking in the background, Justice Kennedy wrote that 
it is not likely that any court—either state or federal—“will hear the 
prisoner’s claim.”231  That is of particular worry for ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims, because “[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel 
at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system.”232 
Thus, a defendant can establish cause to excuse a procedural default if:  
(1) the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was substantial; (2) he 
had no counsel or only ineffective counsel during the state collateral review 
proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the initial review 
for ineffective assistance claims; and (4) state law requires that ineffective 
assistance claims be raised first in a state collateral proceeding.233 
Martinez’s limited holding poses an implicit choice:  states must either 
provide competent postconviction counsel and nullify the Martinez 
exception, or prepare to defend against substantial claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel for years afterward.234  As Justice Scalia warned 
in his dissent, both options have “essentially the same practical 
consequences as a holding that collateral-review counsel is constitutionally 
required.”235  This, Justice Scalia says, “will impose considerable economic 
costs on the States and further impair their ability to provide justice in a 
timely fashion.”236 
Interpreting Martinez, lower courts clung to the “narrowness” of the 
exception, finding it was inapplicable in states that did not require 
defendants to bring ineffective assistance claims in postconviction 
proceedings.237  This meant it was only a matter of time before a defendant 
	
 230. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (finding the right to counsel 
“extends to the first appeal of right, and no further”); see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 
U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (denying the right to postconviction counsel in capital cases and noncapital 
cases because “[s]tate collateral proceedings are not constitutionally required as an adjunct to 
the state criminal proceedings and serve a different and more limited purpose than either the 
trial or appeal”). 
 231. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1316. 
 232. Id. at 1317. 
 233. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 
1318–21). 
 234. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319–20; see also Primus, supra note 79, at 2613, 2616. 
 235. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1322 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 236. Id. at 1327. 
 237. See Ibarra v. Thaler, 687 F.3d 222, 224 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that Martinez only 
applies to states that restrict ineffective assistance claims to postcollateral proceedings), 
overruled by Trevino, 133 S. Ct. 1911; see also Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 785 (6th 
Cir. 2013) (same); Banks v. Workman, 692 F.3d 1133, 1148 (10th Cir. 2012) (same); Arnold 
v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 2012) (same).  Another consequence of Martinez 
is that district courts have expressly limited the Martinez exception to ineffective assistance 
claims, dispelling Justice Scalia’s fear that it could extend to prosecutorial misconduct and 
Brady claims.  See Felix v. Cate, No. CV 11-7713 (JHN) (RNB), 2012 WL 2874398, at *10 
(C.D. Cal. May 8, 2012) (“[T]he narrow exception to Coleman recognized in Martinez 
applies only to defaulted ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.”); Hunton v. Sinclair, 
No. CV-06-0054 (FVS), 2012 WL 1409608, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 23, 2012); Dunn v. 
Norman, No. 4:11CV872 (CDP), 2012 WL 1060128, at *5 n.2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2012) 
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from a state that allowed ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal in 
theory but not in practice would test the boundaries of Martinez. 
B.  Trevino v. Thaler 
The Supreme Court revisited the equitable exception fourteen months 
later.238  The question was predictably straightforward:  does Martinez 
extend to states that do not require ineffective assistance claims to be 
brought in postconviction proceedings?239 
The issue was thrust into the spotlight when lower courts declined to 
apply Martinez because their state system allowed defendants to raise 
claims of ineffective assistance in the forum of their choice:  either in 
postconviction proceedings or on direct appeal.240  In fact, only six states, 
including Arizona, mandate that all ineffective assistance claims be brought 
in collateral proceedings.241  For the remaining forty-three states,242 
whether or not to apply the Martinez exception was an “open question.”243  
These forty-three states vary in their approach to hearing ineffective 
assistance claims, with twenty-seven states only permitting ineffective 
assistance claims on direct appeal when that claim is based on the record, 
and sixteen states offering some mechanism, at least in theory, to expand 
the record to pursue an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.244 
In Trevino, the defendant, Carlos Trevino, was convicted for brutally 
raping and stabbing fifteen-year-old Linda Salinas in 1996.245  Trevino did 
not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in either his direct 
appeal or his state postconviction proceeding, where different attorneys 
represented him.246  In his federal habeas petition, another new attorney 
undertook an independent investigation that revealed mitigating evidence 
that he believed should have been presented at Trevino’s sentencing.247  
Trevino then claimed his trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective, 
because trial counsel had presented only Trevino’s aunt at the sentencing 
phase and no evidence that, among other things, Trevino suffered from 
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, that as a child Trevino had suffered numerous 
head injuries without receiving adequate medical attention, that Trevino’s 
mother had abused him physically and emotionally, that from an early age 
	
(finding Martinez inapplicable to procedurally defaulted claim of insufficient evidence at 
trial because it is “not a claim that trial counsel was ineffective”). 
 238. See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. 1911. 
 239. Id. at 1915. 
 240. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 241. Brief for Utah and 24 Other States As Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7, 
Trevino, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (No. 11-10189), 2013 WL 314455, at *11.  The five other states 
are:  Maine, Missouri, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Virginia. Id. 
 242. Id. at 7.  Martinez has no relevance in Michigan where all ineffective assistance 
appeals are brought on direct appeal. Id. 
 243. Id. at 7. 
 244. Id. at 8–9. 
 245. See Brief for Petitioner at 3–7, Trevino, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (No. 11-10189), 2012 WL 
6587438, at *3–4. 
 246. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1915. 
 247. Id. 
2014] GIVING MEANING TO “MEANINGFUL ENOUGH” 1881 
Trevino abused alcohol and drugs, and that Trevino’s cognitive abilities 
were impaired.248  The federal court stayed proceedings for the state court 
to consider the new claim.249  The state court found that because Trevino 
had not raised it in his first postconviction petition, it was barred.250  The 
federal district court resumed proceedings and found that the claim was 
procedurally barred, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.251 
After Martinez was decided, Trevino filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari on April 30, 2012, seeking reconsideration under Martinez.252  In 
the meantime, the Fifth Circuit held in Ibarra v. Thaler253 that Martinez did 
not apply to Texas because defendants were not required to bring 
ineffective assistance claims in a postconviction proceeding but could, in 
theory, raise them on direct appeal.254 
Thus, the Court had to decide if the differences between states like 
Arizona, which required ineffective assistance claims in postconviction 
proceedings, and states like Texas, which seemed to permit defendants to 
raise such claims in either forum, was legally significant.255  In a five-to-
four decision, the Supreme Court held that, because of the quirks of the 
Texas system, the difference was immaterial and the Martinez exception 
applied.256 
The Court based its holding on two characteristics of the Texas 
system.257  First, in Texas, it was “virtually impossible” to present an 
ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.258  Most ineffective assistance 
claims were difficult to litigate on direct review because the record almost 
always lacks necessary information to substantiate the claim.259  Texas did 
allow defendants to expand the record in a motion for a new trial, but that 
was often “inadequate.”260  The abbreviated deadline and information 
required for the motion was one impediment.261  Texas required that the 
motion be made within thirty days of sentencing, with a ruling within 
seventy-five days of sentencing.262  A forty-five day extension could be 
granted, but the Court found this would greatly impede newly assigned 
	
 248. Id. at 1915–16. 
 249. Id. at 1916. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Trevino, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (No. 11-10189), 2012 
WL 5353864, at *ii. 
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133 S. Ct. 1911. 
 254. Id. at 224. 
 255. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1911, 1916. 
 256. Id. at 1921. 
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counsel unfamiliar to the case.263  Furthermore, the motion had to be 
supported by an affidavit “specifically showing the truth of the grounds of 
attack”264 and a trial transcript.  However, transcripts were not due until 120 
days after sentencing—a deadline that was often liberally extended—so 
counsel would not have the benefit of reading the transcript to flag any 
potential claims, much less be able to attach it.265  Because of these factors, 
Texas could “point to only a comparatively small number of cases in which 
a defendant has used the motion-for-a-new-trial mechanism” 
successfully.266  The Court similarly dismissed Texas’s other methods to 
expand the record for direct appeal, calling them “special” and “limited” in 
their application.267 
Second, the Court also noted that allowing Texas to opt out of the 
Martinez exception “would create significant unfairness.”268  The highest 
court in Texas, in fact, encouraged defendants to raise these claims in 
postconviction proceedings.269  The criminal bar had adopted this advice 
wholeheartedly.270 
After laying out the facets of the Texas appellate system, Justice Breyer 
asked, “How could federal law deny defendants the benefit of Martinez 
solely because of the existence of a theoretically available procedural 
alternative . . . [that is] all but impossible[] to use successfully, and which 
Texas courts so strongly discourage defendants from using?”271  The Court 
held, “What the Arizona law prohibited by explicit terms, Texas law 
precludes as a matter of course.  And, that being so, we can find no 
significant difference between this case and Martinez.”272 
This decision, however, was much more closely contested than Martinez.  
Justices Roberts and Scalia authored dissents and were joined by Justices 
Alito and Thomas, respectively.  Chief Justice Roberts accused the Court of 
“tak[ing] all the starch out of its rule with an assortment of adjectives, 
adverbs, and modifying clauses.”273  The exception in Martinez, he argued, 
was “unusually explicit” and only applied to states that made “a clear 
choice” to deliberately move ineffective assistance claims to postconviction 
forums.274  Chief Justice Roberts added that the new rule would lead to 
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 264. Id. 
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 266. Id. at 1920. 
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 269. Id. at 1920 (“‘[A]s a general rule’ the defendant ‘should not raise an issue of 
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endless questions and litigation and that it flew in the face of federalism, 
finality, and the principles of “equitable balancing” and comity.275 
Justice Scalia weighed in with a 139-word dissent.276  The holding in 
Trevino, he implied, had simply proven his criticism of the Martinez 
exception.277  In addition, he wrote that the Martinez “line lacks any 
principled basis and will not last.”278  In Trevino, he intimated, the Court 
lost sight of the line it had purportedly drawn.279 
Trevino left lower courts in the forty-two remaining states with this test 
to apply in deciding whether to extend the Martinez exception:  “where [a] 
state procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it 
highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful 
opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on 
direct appeal, our holding in Martinez applies.”280 
III.  WHAT IS A “MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY”? 
Since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Trevino, lower 
courts have struggled to apply it.281  The holding in Trevino prevented 
lower courts from automatically rejecting the Martinez exception if state 
procedure allowed, at least in theory, defendants to bring ineffective 
assistance claims on direct appeal, however inadvisable it was.282  
Dismissing a “distinction without a difference” in Texas, the Supreme 
Court found that the Martinez exception applied to any state that does not 
offer defendants “a meaningful opportunity” to claim ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel on direct appeal.283 
Now, when facing a Martinez claim, most lower courts must determine 
whether the state system offers defendants such an opportunity.284  If it 
does, they can eschew the Martinez exception.  If it does not, then those 
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(2013); Dansby v. Hobbs, 133 S. Ct. 2767 (2013). 
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courts must allow defendants to raise a defaulted claim if they can show, 
among other things, that their claim is substantial.285 
But what kind of state framework provides a meaningful opportunity?  
This was the concern Chief Justice Roberts expressed in his Trevino 
dissent, writing that “[w]e are not told, for example, how meaningful is 
meaningful enough, how meaningfulness is to be measured.”286 
This discussion is starting to emerge in the lower courts of many of the 
forty-two states that offer defendants an opportunity to bring ineffective 
assistance challenges either on direct appeal or in a collateral proceeding.  
This Part examines how courts in four states are endeavoring to answer this 
question.  Because many states have unique appellate rules, this section 
compares some rules that affect all claims on direct appeal, namely:  
whether the state automatically provides new counsel; whether the state 
allows for expansion of the record; if so, whether the motion has reasonable 
requirements, practical deadlines, and if it is commonly granted; whether 
the state has any other unique provisions that impact ineffective assistance 
claims; and whether the state court has encouraged such claims to be 
relegated to postconviction proceedings. 
Part III.A looks to Illinois, where the Northern District of Illinois has 
found that defendants do have a meaningful opportunity to raise ineffective 
assistance claims on direct appeal.  Part III.B explains Ohio’s appellate 
procedure and notes that several federal court judges in the Southern 
District of Ohio do not believe defendants have the requisite opportunity to 
make ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal.  Part III.C explores the 
split among district courts in Tennessee.  Part III.D examines the holding of 
the Eighth Circuit in the wake of Trevino, in which it found that Arkansas 
does not offer defendants a meaningful opportunity to raise ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal.287 
A.  Illinois 
Because Illinois allows defendants to pursue ineffective assistance claims 
on direct appeal, Illinois federal courts originally held that Martinez did not 
apply to state defendants.288  But since the Trevino decision expanded the 
Martinez rule, district courts in Illinois have had to consider whether state 
procedure provides the necessary meaningful opportunity to raise 
	
 285. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921.  In addition to showing the claim of ineffective 
assistance is substantial, a defendant must also show that he had no counsel or only 
ineffective counsel during the state collateral review proceeding and that the state collateral 
review proceeding was the initial review for the ineffective assistance claim. Id. 
 286. Id. at 1923 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 287. The Eighth Circuit was the first circuit court to weigh in on the Trevino rule. See 
Sasser v. Hobbs, 735 F.3d 833, 853 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 288. See Murphy v. Atchison, No. 12 C 3106, 2013 WL 4495652, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 
19, 2013); see also Turner v. Harrington, No. 11-cv-07771, 2013 WL 2296189, at *14 (N.D. 
Ill. May 24, 2013); Weekly v. Hardy, No. 11 C 9231, 2012 WL 3916269, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 6, 2012); Butler v. Hardy, No. 11 C 4840, 2012 WL 3643924, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 
2012); Gill v. Atchison, No. 11 C 7868, 2012 WL 2597873, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2012); 
Blair v. Rednour, No. 11 C 4108, 2012 WL 1280831, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2012). 
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ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal.  Because state court 
precedent allows defendants to raise ineffective assistance claims pro se and 
sometimes receive new counsel before direct appeal, one judge in the 
Northern District of Illinois recently held that defendants do have a 
meaningful opportunity to bring ineffective assistance claims on direct 
appeal.289 
1.  New Counsel and Expansion of the Record 
Regardless of whether a defendant raises an ineffective assistance claim 
on appeal, Illinois does not automatically grant new counsel.290  However, 
state procedures occasionally allow for a defendant to get a new attorney if 
he or she can show some merit to an ineffective assistance claim.  To 
receive new counsel, a defendant must file a pro se ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel claim and ask the court to appoint a different attorney.291  
When that occurs, the court conducts a “preliminary investigation.”292  If 
the claim is frivolous, no new counsel is appointed, but if the claim has 
merit, the court will appoint new counsel to argue the allegations of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.293  This procedure aims to maximize 
efficiency in balancing frivolous, abusive claims while protecting 
potentially meritorious petitions.294 
Often, a defendant’s pro se petition for new counsel will be interpreted as 
a motion for new trial.295  Illinois is one of eleven states that allow 
defendants to bring a motion for a new trial.296  Such a motion is the only 
way to supplement a trial record before appellate review.297 
State procedure dictates that this motion must be brought within thirty 
days of a guilty verdict or the entry of a finding.298  However, claims 
	
 289. See Murphy, 2013 WL 4495652, at *24. 
 290. See People v. Moore, 797 N.E.2d 631, 637 (Ill. 2003). 
 291. See, e.g., People v. McKinney, 962 N.E.2d 1084, 1092 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
 292. See, e.g., 14B PAUL M. COLTOFF ET AL., ILLINOIS LAW AND PRACTICE § 578 (2013); 
see also People v. Tucker, 889 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“[T]he court must 
inquire . . . .”). 
 293. See Moore, 797 N.E.2d at 637; see also People v. Krankel, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (Ill. 
1984).  In Krankel, the defendant maintained his trial counsel did not investigate his alibi, 
leading to his burglary conviction. Krankel, 464 N.E.2d at 1046.  He raised the claim pro se 
when his trial counsel failed to include it in the motion for a new trial. Id.  The Illinois 
Supreme Court remanded the case so that the trial court could hold a hearing on his 
attorney’s competence, while simultaneously expanding the record for appeal. Id. at 1049.  
At the court’s instruction, the defendant was provided a new attorney. Id. 
 294. See People v. Patrick, 960 N.E.2d 1114, 1123 (Ill. 2011).  These so-called Krankel 
hearings are “intended to promote consideration of pro se ineffective assistance claims in the 
trial court and to limit issues on appeal.” Id. 
 295. See Krankel, 464 N.E.2d at 1049. 
 296. Brief for Utah and 24 Other States As Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra 
note 241, at 8. 
 297. See Primus, supra note 79, at 2618. 
 298. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-1 (West 2008) provides in pertinent part:  
“(a) Following a verdict or finding of guilty the court may grant the defendant a new trial. 
(b) A written motion for a new trial shall be filed by the defendant within 30 days following 
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alleging ineffective assistance are given special latitude.  Unless the state 
objects, a defendant may make an oral motion for a new trial, alleging 
ineffective assistance.299  The courts will also consider such claims outside 
the mandatory thirty-day deadline.300 
2.  Recommendation by Illinois Courts 
However, if a defendant does not make a motion for a new trial alleging 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Illinois state courts have refused to 
address ineffective assistance claims beyond the record on direct appeal, 
finding it is “more appropriate that the defendant’s contentions be 
addressed in a proceeding for postconviction relief.”301  In that instance, 
“[t]he appellate court may properly decline to adjudicate the defendant’s 
claim in his direct appeal from his criminal conviction.”302  Many courts 
have followed this directive and recommended that ineffective assistance 
claims be relegated to postconviction proceedings.303 
3.  Murphy v. Atchison 
In Murphy v. Atchison,304 Judge Gottschall in the Northern District of 
Illinois found that state procedures do provide a meaningful opportunity to 
pursue ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal.305  In subsequent 
decisions, other federal district judges in Illinois have adopted the same 
position.306 
In Murphy, the defendant, Lee Murphy, was convicted of shooting and 
stabbing Choni Dade and her two children, five-year-old Dashay Barlow 
and two-year-old Jailan Carter, on March 17, 2003, in their home on the 
south side of Chicago.307  Dade died soon after she reached the hospital, but 
Dashay and Jailan survived after extensive medical treatment.308  Murphy, 
Dade’s former boyfriend, was found guilty of Dade’s murder and the 
	
the entry of a finding or the return of a verdict.  Reasonable notice of the motion shall be 
served upon the State. (c) The motion for a new trial shall specify the grounds therefor.” 
 299. See COLTOFF ET AL., supra note 292, § 800. 
 300. Id.; see, e.g., People v. Patrick, 960 N.E.2d 1114, 1123 (Ill. 2011) (waiving the 
thirty-day statutory deadline for filing a motion for new trial when the defendant alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel, because the court’s evaluation of the attorney’s competence 
should not be constrained by the statutory deadline). 
 301. People v. Parker, 801 N.E.2d 162, 169 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (quoting People v. Burns, 
709 N.E.2d 672, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)). 
 302. Parker, 801 N.E.2d at 169. 
 303. See In re Ch. W., 927 N.E.2d 872, 876–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); People v. Phillips, 
890 N.E.2d 1058, 1079 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); People v. Millsap, 873 N.E.2d 396, 402–03 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2007); People v. Ligon, 847 N.E.2d 763, 775–76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 304. No. 12 C 3106, 2013 WL 4495652, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2013). 
 305. Id. 
 306. See Diaz v. Pfister, No. 12 C 286, 2013 WL 4782065, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2013) 
(holding that neither Martinez nor Trevino constitute cause that excuses the procedural 
default of the defendant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims); see also Kirkpatrick 
v. Lambert, No. 12 C 50400, 2013 WL 5477567, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2013) (same). 
 307. Murphy, 2013 WL 4495652, at *1. 
 308. Id. 
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attempted murders of her children after a jury trial in Cook County.309  He 
was sentenced to 115 years in prison.310 
After his direct appeal, Murphy moved pro se for a writ of habeas corpus, 
alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective.311  He 
claimed that his counsel should have objected to Dashay’s identification of 
him in a police lineup because the lineup was overly suggestive.312  He 
claimed that he had an alibi for the time of the murder but his counsel 
refused to pursue an alibi defense.313  He claimed his counsel should have 
called five witnesses that could have corroborated his alibi, but his attorney 
failed to investigate or contact them.314 
However, these claims, which were never presented in one full round of 
state court proceedings, were barred by the doctrine of procedural 
default.315  The Northern District of Illinois first determined that Murphy 
did not have cause to excuse his default under the traditional Coleman 
doctrine.316  However, because Murphy had proceeded pro se in his initial 
collateral motion, the district court looked to see whether his position was 
bolstered by the decisions in Martinez and Trevino.317  The court found that 
the Martinez exception did not apply to Murphy, because Illinois state 
procedures allow for the expansion of the record before direct appeal.318 
The court specifically cited the availability of Krankel hearings, which can 
also provide defendants with new counsel.319  Judge Gottschall wrote that 
Illinois law was critically different from the provisions of Texas law that 
the Supreme Court found problematic.320  She found that these differences 
provided “Murphy . . . a meaningful chance to raise an ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim in his direct proceedings, had he chosen to 
do so.”321 
	
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at *1, *9. 
 312. Id. at *9. 
 313. Id. at *10. 
 314. Id. at *9. 
 315. Id. at *10.  A petitioner must present his claims to all levels of the Illinois courts to 
avoid procedural default. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844–45 (1999).  In other 
words, Murphy had to present the claims in his federal habeas petition to the state trial court, 
the Illinois Appellate Court, and the Illinois Supreme Court. 
 316. Murphy, 2013 WL 4495652, at *20–21. 
 317. Id. at *21. 
 318. Id. at *22. (“[U]nder Illinois law a petitioner can adequately develop the factual 
record supporting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim prior to his direct appeal . . . .” 
(quoting Butler v. Hardy, No. 11 C 4840, 2012 WL 3643924, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 
2012))). 
 319. Id.; see supra notes 293–94 (discussing People v. Krankel, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (Ill. 
1984)). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
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B.  Ohio 
Like Illinois, Ohio federal courts originally clung to a narrow 
interpretation of Martinez, finding that it did not apply because Ohio 
allowed ineffective assistance claims to be raised on direct appeal.322  Since 
Trevino, defendants have petitioned lower courts to reconsider.  Now, 
unlike Illinois, some federal courts in the Southern District of Ohio have 
found that defendants do not have a meaningful opportunity to raise 
ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal in Ohio state courts and thus, 
the Martinez exception applies.323 
1.  New Counsel and Expansion of the Record 
Ohio defendants are not automatically provided a different attorney on 
direct appeal.324  Ohio law does allow defendants to move for a new trial, in 
an effort to expand the record before direct appeal, on the grounds of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.325  A motion for a new trial on the 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel must be filed within fourteen 
days after the verdict, unless it appears, by clear and convincing proof, that 
the defendant was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for new 
trial.326  It seems that courts infrequently grant a motion for a new trial 
based on ineffective assistance, with one court calling it “rare.”327  In 
dismissing such petitions, state courts have held that “a petition for post-
conviction relief may provide a more effective and appropriate vehicle for 
the assertion of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.”328 
	
 322. Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 785 (6th Cir. 2013) (“We respect Martinez’s 
emphasis that its conclusion was a narrow one and join our sister circuits in refusing to 
expand it.”); McGuire v. Warden, Mansfield Corr. Inst., No. 3:99-CV-140, 2013 WL 
1131423, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2013) (“[T]he state of Ohio does not require claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel to be brought in such a [initial-review collateral] 
proceeding, and it regularly considers these claims on direct appeal.” (quoting In re 
Hartman, No. 12-4255, slip op. at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 2012)) (alterations in original)). 
 323. See Raglin v. Mitchell, No. 1:00CV767, 2013 WL 5468227, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 
29, 2013); Landrum v. Anderson, No. 1:96-CV-641, 2013 WL 5423815, at *10 (S.D. Ohio 
Sept. 26, 2013); Henness v. Bagley, No. 2:01-CV-043, 2013 WL 4017643, at *3 (S.D. Ohio 
Aug. 6, 2013); McGuire, 2013 WL 1131423, at *6. 
 324. See United States v. Anderson, 409 F. Supp. 2d 925, 926 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (“Trial 
counsel in criminal cases, whether retained or appointed by the district court, is responsible 
for the continued representation of the client on appeal until specifically relieved by this 
Court.”); see also OHIO R. CRIM. P. 44(a) (requiring courts to assign indigent defendants 
counsel “at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before a court through 
appeal as of right”). 
 325. Ohio rules of criminal procedure specify six causes under which a defendant may 
move for a new trial.  Ineffective assistance can be raised under Ohio Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 33(A)(1), which provides for a new trial if there was “[i]rregularity in the 
proceedings . . . because of which the defendant was prevented from having a fair trial.” 
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 33(A)(1). 
 326. Id. R. 33(B). 
 327. See, e.g., State v. Urban, No. 01AP–239, 2002 WL 464980, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Mar. 28, 2002) (“On direct appeal of a criminal conviction, it is rare that we have in the 
record a motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel and rare that the trial 
court has held an evidentiary hearing and oral argument on the issue.”). 
 328. State v. Lordi, 748 N.E.2d 566, 572 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). 
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2.  Res Judicata 
The decision of whether to raise an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal 
has important consequences because of Ohio’s strict res judicata rule.  If a 
defendant chooses to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on 
direct appeal, res judicata may preclude the defendant from re-raising the 
claim in postconviction proceedings.329  However, if a defendant forgoes 
the claim in his direct appeal, the courts can find it is barred because it 
should have been raised.330  The Sixth Circuit recognized that this puts 
defendants in “somewhat of a procedural quandary”: 
[E]ither [a defendant] must raise his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim immediately on direct appeal and risk a potentially premature 
dispositive denial, or he must forego his claim on direct appeal and simply 
hope that he can thereafter develop sufficient outside-the-record evidence 
to overcome res judicata on collateral review.331 
However, the Ohio Supreme Court has also recognized that a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata where the claim is raised, for the first time, in a postconviction 
proceeding and the petitioner was represented by the same counsel both at 
trial and on appeal.332  The rationale for this proposition is that counsel 
cannot be expected to assert his own ineffectiveness.333 
3.  Recommendation by Ohio Courts 
The forum that Ohio courts favor for ineffective assistance claims 
depends on whether the claim is supported by the record.334  If evidentiary 
support can be found in the record, Ohio courts not only allow—but 
require—that the claims be brought on direct appeal, through the 
application of res judicata, “despite the comparative evidentiary limitations 
concomitant on direct appeal.”335  However, Ohio state courts have found 
that when ineffective assistance claims are not based on the record, they are 
better suited for postconviction proceedings.336 
	
 329. See generally State v. Cole, 443 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio 1982); State v. Perry, 226 N.E.2d 
104 (Ohio 1967). 
 330. Hanna v. Ishee, 694 F.3d 596, 614 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 331. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 332. State v. Lentz, 639 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ohio 1994). 
 333. Id. at 785 (“[C]ounsel cannot realistically be expected to argue his own 
incompetence . . . .” (quoting Cole, 443 N.E.2d at 171 n.1)). 
 334. See Hanna, 694 F.3d at 614. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Hartman v. Bagley, 492 F.3d 347, 357 (6th Cir. 2007); State v. Harrington, 876 
N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ohio App. Ct. 2007); State v. Singerman, 685 N.E.2d 279, 280 (Ohio App. 
Ct. 1996). 
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4.  Landrum v. Anderson 
In Landrum v. Anderson,337 a magistrate judge in the Southern District of 
Ohio recommended that the Martinez exception apply to Ohio defendants 
because Ohio did not provide a defendant with a meaningful opportunity to 
raise ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal.338  In subsequent cases, 
three other federal judges in the Southern District of Ohio have agreed with 
this recommendation.339 
The defendant, Lawrence Landrum, was convicted of burglary and first-
degree murder.340  In a prior habeas petition, Landrum claimed that his 
attorney was ineffective for failing to call a witness that would have 
implicated his co-defendant instead of him.341  But the Sixth Circuit refused 
to reach the merits, finding that Landrum procedurally defaulted his claim 
“because he failed to raise this claim on direct appeal and in his post-
conviction petition.”342  Landrum, the Sixth Circuit continued, was unable 
to excuse this default because he failed to file a timely request to reopen his 
appeal and because ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel cannot 
constitute cause.343 
In 2012, Landrum moved to reopen the judgment after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Martinez.344  After a judge in the Southern District of 
Ohio granted his request, the magistrate judge found that Martinez should 
apply to Ohio defendants.345  The exception, the magistrate judge found, is 
applicable in Ohio because defendants saddled with the same lawyer at trial 
and on appeal must pursue ineffective assistance claims in postconviction 
proceedings.346  The magistrate found that the Court’s ruling in Trevino 
only strengthened the application to Ohio.347 
	
 337. No. 1:96 CV 641, 2013 WL 5423815 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2013). 
 338. Id. at *10. 
 339. Raglin v. Mitchell, No. 1:00CV767, 2013 WL 5468227, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 
2013) (“This Court has found that the Martinez exception applies to a case where, because of 
the way Ohio post-conviction review law is structured, the ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim had to be brought in post-conviction.” (quoting Henness v. Bagley, No. 2:01-
CV-043, 2013 WL 4017643, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 2013))); see also Henness, 2013 WL 
4017643, at *3 (“Henness’ Martinez-based claim is cognizable in this Court.”); McGuire v. 
Warden, Mansfield Corr. Inst., No. 3:99-CV-140, 2013 WL 1131423, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 
18, 2013) (“An argument can be made that the Martinez exception should apply in Ohio in 
those narrow circumstances.”). 
 340. Landrum v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 905, 912 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 341. Id. at 913 (second amended habeas petition).  For more information on Landrum’s 
claims, see supra intro. 
 342. Mitchell, 625 F.3d at 919. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Landrum v. Anderson, No. 1:96 CV 641, 2013 WL 5423815, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 
26, 2013). 
 345. Id. at *10. 
 346. Id. at *2 (“Ohio does require that [ineffective assistance] claims be brought in 
[postconviction proceedings] when they depend on evidence outside the record . . . [or] when 
a defendant has been represented on appeal by the same attorney who represented him at 
trial.”). 
 347. Id.  The magistrate judge also found that Landrum had a substantial claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel, writing, “It is plain from the record that trial counsels’ 
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However, the magistrate acknowledged that based on Sixth Circuit 
holdings issued before Trevino, the district court lacked authority to apply 
its newfound understanding of Martinez.348  Instead, the judge 
recommended that the Sixth Circuit reconsider the issue on appeal.349  
Other federal district judges in the Southern District of Ohio have 
recommended a similar approach.350 
C.  Tennessee 
Federal district courts in Tennessee initially held that state defendants 
could not depend on the Martinez exception to establish cause, because the 
state allows ineffective assistance claims to proceed by direct appeal as well 
as in postconviction proceedings.351  Since the Supreme Court’s expansion 
of the exception in Trevino, the question has reemerged.  However, an 
analysis of the appellate framework in Tennessee has led federal judges in 
the Western and Middle Districts of Tennessee to opposite conclusions on 
whether defendants have the requisite meaningful opportunity to raise 
ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal.352 
1.  New Counsel and Expansion of the Record 
In Tennessee, counsel appointed to represent a defendant during trial 
must continue to represent that defendant through an appeal when the trial 
resulted in a prison sentence.353  Appointed counsel cannot withdraw unless 
permitted by a court.354 
Tennessee allows defendants to expand the record by introducing 
evidence in a motion for a new trial.355  However, in Tennessee, a “motion 
for a new trial is not just an optional pleading.”356  It acts to stay the 
running of the deadline for appeal and it is a necessary predicate to 
appellate review of most alleged errors in the trial court.357  Tennessee state 
	
deficient performance stemmed from ignorance of the law rather than from any strategic 
choice” and postconviction counsel failed “to include a claim in a pleading even though the 
facts in support of the claim were in counsel’s hands.” Id. at *5–6. 
 348. Id. at *10. 
 349. Id. 
 350. See supra note 339 and accompanying text. 
 351. See, e.g., Leberry v. Howerton, No. 3:10-00624, 2012 WL 2999775, at *1–2 (M.D. 
Tenn. July 23, 2012) (holding, pre-Trevino, that the exception does not apply). 
 352. See Moore v. Steward, No. 2:09-CV-02698(JPM)(CGC), 2013 WL 4434371, at *3 
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2013) (dictum) (noting that defendants do not have a meaningful 
opportunity to raise ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal); Means v. Lester, No. 11-
2646(JPM)(TMP), 2013 WL 3992506, at *14 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 5, 2013) (dictum) (same). 
But see Rahman v. Carpenter, No. 3:96-0380, 2013 WL 3865071, at *5–6 (M.D. Tenn. July 
25, 2013) (finding defendants do have a meaningful opportunity to raise ineffective 
assistance claims on direct appeal). 
 353. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-203 (West 2012). 
 354. TENN. R. CRIM. P. 37(e). 
 355. 11 DAVID LOUIS RAYBIN, TENNESSEE CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 33:23 
(2013). 
 356. Id. § 33:18. 
 357. Id. 
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courts will not consider issues on appeal that were not presented in a motion 
for new trial.358  As noted by the Tennessee Supreme Court: 
When the rules governing appellate procedure were revised, the motion 
for a new trial was retained as an important step of post-trial and appellate 
procedure in jury cases. This was done so that the trial judge might be 
given an opportunity to consider or to reconsider alleged errors committed 
during the course of the trial or other matters affecting the jury or the 
verdict, such as alleged misconduct of jurors, parties, or counsel which 
either occurred after the trial or could not reasonably have been 
discovered until after the verdict.359 
Tennessee courts have a strict thirty-day deadline in which to file a motion 
for a new trial.360  However, courts will liberally grant motions to amend 
the initial filing.361  Courts will allow testimony in open court, as well as 
sworn affidavits on relevant issues.362 
2.  Recommendation by Tennessee Courts 
State courts ordinarily address ineffective assistance claims in 
postconviction proceedings because such claims typically rely on facts 
outside the record.363  Courts in Tennessee have said that raising such 
claims on direct appeal is “strongly disfavored,”364 calling the choice to do 
so “fraught with peril”365 and “ill-advised.”366  These claims, instead, are 
litigated in collateral proceedings,367 because once an ineffective assistance 
claim has been raised on direct appeal, that claim is barred in collateral 
proceedings even if different allegations of ineffectiveness are raised.368  As 
the defendant in Smith v. Colson argued: 
Texas (at least as a matter of theory) allows defendants to advance 
ineffective-assistance claims in state habeas proceedings even if those 
claims were rejected on direct appeal, so long as there was not an 
adequate record to resolve those claims on direct appeal; in Tennessee, in 
contrast, once an ineffective-assistance claim is rejected on direct appeal, 
	
 358. Id. 
 359. McCormic v. Smith, 659 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tenn. 1983). 
 360. See 11 RAYBIN, supra note 355, § 33:21. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. § 33:23. 
 363. Moore v. Steward, No. 2:09-CV-02698(JPM), 2013 WL 4434371, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. 
Aug. 14, 2013). 
 364. See State v. Day, No. E2010-01108-CCA-R3-C, 2012 WL 2926155, at *8 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. July 18, 2012). 
 365. Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (quoting State v. 
Sluder, No. 1236, 1990 WL 26552, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 1990)). 
 366. Sluder, 1990 WL 26552, at *7. 
 367. Moore, 2013 WL 4434371, at *3. 
 368. See, e.g., Troglin v. State, No. E2010-01838-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 4790943, at 
*16 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2011) (“[T]he petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel was previously determined by this court on direct appeal and cannot be 
relitigated in a post-conviction proceeding, even though the petitioner may not have made 
the same allegations on direct appeal that he now makes in his post-conviction petition.”). 
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no future ineffective-assistance claims are permitted, even if a later claim 
involves new evidence or separate allegations of ineffectiveness.369 
However, despite these dangers, some defendants have successfully raised 
ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal.370 
3.  Moore v. Steward and Rahman v. Carpenter 
Two recent federal district court decisions showcase the disagreement 
over the existence of a meaningful opportunity on direct appeal in 
Tennessee:  Moore v. Steward371 and Rahman v. Carpenter.372 
In Moore, defendant Ronald Donnell Moore was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after shooting and killing 
an acquaintance outside a grocery store.373  The state court affirmed his 
conviction on direct appeal and denied his application for postconviction 
relief and his subsequent appeal of that denial.374  The Western District of 
Tennessee denied his initial habeas petition because ineffective assistance 
of postconviction counsel could not excuse a procedural default.375  Moore 
asked for reconsideration under Trevino.376 
In Rahman, the defendant, Abu-Ali Abdur Rahman, also asked the 
district court to reconsider under Trevino his procedurally defaulted claims 
denied in a prior habeas petition.377 Rahman was convicted of first-degree 
murder for gagging, blindfolding, and stabbing a small-time marijuana 
dealer in the dealer’s home.378 
Faced with similar requests, both courts denied the defendants’ petitions 
for reconsideration, but reached different conclusions as to Trevino’s 
applicability in Tennessee.379  Judge McCalla of the Western District of 
Tennessee noted that Tennessee defendants did not have a meaningful 
opportunity to raise ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal because in 
Tennessee, “issues of ineffective assistance of trial counsel ordinarily are 
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addressed in post-conviction proceedings.”380  Another judge in the 
Western District adopted the same rationale in a different criminal case, 
finding that a meaningful opportunity on direct appeal does not exist for 
Tennessee defendants.381 
However, Judge Campbell of the Middle District, in Rahman, explicitly 
rejected that line of reasoning, finding that raising an ineffective assistance 
claim on direct appeal is not “virtually impossible” as it is in Texas.382  He 
acknowledged that it is more common for defendants to raise ineffective 
assistance claims in postconviction proceedings, but found that Tennessee’s 
motion for a new trial allows the extrarecord development needed for 
ineffective assistance claims.383  Further, he added that ineffectiveness 
claims are evaluated under the same standard on direct appeals and in 
collateral proceedings.384 
D.  Arkansas 
Although the Eighth Circuit originally declined to apply the Martinez 
exception, it was the first circuit court to parse Trevino’s “meaningful 
opportunity” standard when it examined Arkansas’s appellate 
framework.385  The Eighth Circuit found that without automatically 
providing new counsel, Arkansas could not meet the bar the Court set in 
Trevino.386 
1.  New Counsel and Expansion of the Record 
Arkansas does not provide defendants with new counsel on direct appeal, 
as a matter of course.387  State law provides a mechanism for defendants to 
request a new trial under the auspices of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel, among other claims.388  The motion must be filed within thirty 
days and should be accompanied by affidavits supporting the claim if 
possible.389  The court is instructed to designate a hearing date, if 
warranted, within ten days of filing.390  State courts may grant such relief 
“in limited circumstances” including in “the interest of judicial 
economy.”391  However, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has found that 
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when a defendant could not develop his ineffective assistance claim on the 
record at trial and presents more than “bare allegations” in his motion for 
new trial, “a hearing was essential for the trial judge to examine in detail the 
sufficiency of the representation.”392 
2.  Recommendation by Arkansas Courts 
The few reported cases in which an Arkansas defendant successfully 
obtained an ineffective assistance hearing on direct appeal involved 
defendants who raised the claims pro se or who had the means to hire new 
counsel.393  In most reported cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court simply 
refused to consider ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal.394 
3.  Sasser v. Hobbs 
The Eighth Circuit concluded recently that “Arkansas did not as a 
systematic matter afford . . . meaningful review of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal.”395  In Sasser v. Hobbs, 
defendant Andrew Sasser was sentenced to death after a conviction for 
capital felony murder for raping and murdering a convenience store 
clerk.396  After the Western District of Arkansas denied Sasser’s defaulted 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his habeas petition, the Eighth 
Circuit reconsidered the case under the Court’s recent holding in 
Trevino.397  The court found that because Arkansas did not provide new 
counsel on appeal, Sasser could not make a meaningful claim of ineffective 
assistance.398  The court noted: 
 Although new appellate counsel is not, by itself, sufficient to guarantee 
capital defendants a meaningful opportunity to challenge their trial 
counsel’s effectiveness on direct appeal, it is a necessary part of such a 
guarantee. Otherwise, appointed trial counsel must question his own 
effectiveness—a conceptually difficult task for several reasons, including 
trial counsel typically must be a witness in any ineffectiveness hearing.399 
In the wake of Trevino, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that asking a 
lawyer to assert his own ineffectiveness would “violate the lawyer’s duty of 
zealous representation to his client and . . . his duty of candor to the 
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court.”400  The court noted that had Sasser raised such a claim pro se, the 
court likely would have appointed new counsel, “[b]ut a procedure to assure 
adequate representation cannot depend on a defendant’s acting without 
representation.”401  Because of these factors, the state framework falls short 
of the meaningful opportunity the Court requires in Trevino.402 
IV.  NEW COUNSEL GUARANTEES MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY 
In promulgating the Martinez exception, the Supreme Court acted to 
ensure that repeat representation by incompetent counsel would not strip a 
defendant of the opportunity to make a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.403  The Court narrowly aimed this holding at states which 
mandate that ineffective assistance claims be brought in collateral 
proceedings,404 where the Constitution does not guarantee counsel, much 
less effective counsel.405  But in Trevino, the Court broadened the 
exception, applying it to states that permit such claims on direct appeal 
where defendants have the right to effective assistance of counsel.406  The 
test whether to apply Martinez now turns on whether states have a 
procedural framework that “by reason of its design and operation, makes it 
highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful 
opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on 
direct appeal.”407  Although this flexible standard seems to be an attempt to 
fit the varied rules of state criminal procedure, it gives lower federal courts 
little guidance in deciding what rules constitute a meaningful opportunity in 
the states where they sit.408 
The lack of guidance poses several problems.  First, when it comes to 
rules of criminal procedure, one size does not fit all.  Each state can choose 
the methods and practices by which it adjudicates crimes so long as these 
practices meet the floor required by the Constitution.  Consequently, 
criminal procedure is far from uniform throughout the states, depending on, 
among other things, the state’s size, resources, public opinion, and the 
political response to public opinion.  This is apparent in even a cursory 
examination of state appellate procedure:  Illinois permits defendants to file 
an optional motion for new trial,409 while Tennessee requires such a motion 
as a predicate for all issues raised on appeal.410  Both motions can allow for 
expansion of the record, but they promote different policy considerations 
within the states. 
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Second, lower courts must discern how these rules actually play out in 
day-to-day appellate practice.  In Trevino, the Court found that while Texas 
did offer defendants a chance to expand the record by filing a motion for a 
new trial, in practice, it was nearly impossible to use this mechanism 
successfully because of the strictly enforced deadlines and the requirement 
that a trial transcript be attached long before it was prepared.411  Put 
differently, a framework that is meaningful in one state may not be so 
meaningful in another—thus, there is no simple checklist for lower courts 
to follow. 
Third, courts must examine a defendant’s claims in light of the state’s 
appellate framework as a whole.  The Trevino standard asks federal courts 
to determine whether the state procedures make it “highly unlikely in a 
typical case” that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity on 
appeal.412  In Trevino, while the Court looked to what procedural hurdles 
the defendant faced in raising his ineffective assistance claim, the Court 
examined the Texas framework as a whole.413  This means that courts must 
not only look to the proper outcome of a case, but also make broader 
judgments of that case’s typicality within the system as a whole. 
Because of these difficulties, the best method to fairly apply a single 
standard while accounting for the differences among the states must take 
into account a variety of factors that affect ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims on direct appeal.  The most important of these is the provision of 
new counsel on appeal.  Without unconflicted appellate counsel that can 
examine trial counsel’s actions, defendants cannot have a meaningful 
opportunity to raise ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal.  
However, while this Note posits that new counsel is necessary for a 
meaningful opportunity on direct appeal, it is by no means sufficient.  There 
are additional factors courts must take into consideration, such as 
mechanisms to expand the record. 
This Part proposes a set of factors that lower courts should examine in 
determining whether a state offers a meaningful opportunity under Trevino.  
Part IV.A explains which elements courts should use in their analysis.  Part 
IV.B critiques the conclusions of the courts who have already performed a 
Trevino analysis. 
A.  The Elements of Meaningful Opportunity 
The very nature of most ineffective assistance claims means that they are 
not well suited for direct appeal.414  These claims are not based on the 
record, which is the sole consideration for deciding a direct appeal.415  That 
means that if a state has a mechanism for expanding the record, an 
individual must become familiar with the transcript and strategy at trial and 
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attempt to uncover what the trial attorney failed to see—all within deadlines 
of a week to a month.416 
Faced with these shortfalls, it is hard to see how any defendant could 
have a meaningful opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance claim on 
direct appeal.  However, if states make certain mechanisms available to 
defendants, significant ineffective assistance claims can be raised.  The 
Supreme Court articulated some of these factors in its Trevino holding, 
particularly an opportunity to expand the record prior to a direct appeal.417  
The Court also pointed out that in Texas, state courts usually strongly 
recommended claims be brought in postconviction proceedings.418  Thus, 
the recommended forum of the state itself should also be factored into the 
analysis.  However, the first and most significant determination must be 
whether a state provides new, unconflicted counsel on direct appeal. 
1.  New Counsel 
As the Eighth Circuit recognized in Sasser, the starting point for the 
meaningful opportunity analysis must be whether the state provides new 
counsel on direct appeal.419  Without new counsel, a defendant is left to 
conceive, investigate, and litigate his claims pro se—an option the Martinez 
Court said poses difficulties because a pro se appellant is unlikely to 
possess the necessary understanding of trial strategy or be capable of 
performing the required investigative work.420  Asking trial attorneys to 
claim their own ineffectiveness could expose them to malpractice suits.421  
Such a request is not within the bounds of zealous representation required 
of all attorneys. 
Some states, like Illinois, allow a defendant to petition for a new counsel 
on appeal.422  This is problematic because a defendant must first recognize 
the grounds for ineffective assistance—a complicated claim by any 
standard—and successfully notify the court of his or her desire for new 
counsel.  Putting this burden on the defendant will likely lead to many 
significant and worthy claims being unaddressed. 
The Supreme Court did not address the provision of new counsel in 
Trevino because Texas has a practice of providing new appellate 
representation.423  However, Texas, even with this safeguard, did not offer 
defendants a meaningful opportunity.424  This demonstrates that, as the 
Eighth Circuit noted in Sasser, new counsel is not sufficient but is 
necessary.425 
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2.  Trevino Factors:  Expansion of the Record and Recommended Forum 
If a state does provide new counsel, as Texas does, courts should next 
look to the two additional factors analyzed in Trevino:  whether a state 
provides the opportunity for expansion of the record and the state courts’ 
own recommendation to defendants pursuing ineffective assistance 
claims.426  Texas’s motion for a new trial, which could expand the record, 
was deemed “inadequate” because of its short deadline and required 
attachment of the (often unavailable) transcript.427 
To achieve meaningfulness, it is crucial for a state to offer some kind of 
mechanism to expand the record, because ineffective assistance claims 
typically cannot be raised based only on the record.428 
A motion for a new trial, offered by eleven states,429 is one way to 
expand the record in advance of a direct appeal.430  Five other states have 
provisions that allow courts to remand a case during direct appeal to reopen 
the record.431  Illinois’s Krankel hearings are another example.432 
However, not all states’ motions for a new trial are created equal.  In 
Tennessee, a motion for a new trial—which is a required predicate for 
appellate issues—serves to expand the record on appeal simply by its 
filing.433  Other states, like Texas, rarely grant such motions.434 
The Supreme Court, in Trevino, also took note of the forum Texas state 
courts recommended to defendants.435  A state court’s recommendation is 
not dispositive—the Supreme Court itself has offered the same 
recommendation.436  However, it is a telling look at how the state court 
judges view ineffective assistance claims, and if judges believe such claims 
should routinely be pursued in postconviction proceedings, they are less 
likely to give them proper consideration on direct appeal. 
3.  Other Factors 
Courts should also consider factors unique to a state’s procedural 
framework.  Federal courts in Ohio must account for the state’s res judicata 
rule.437  Courts in Tennessee must note the consequences of requiring 
motions for new trial as a predicate for issues raised on direct appeal.438  
The variation in the state criminal justice system will mean courts must 
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always exercise some discretion as to how defendants are impacted on 
appeal. 
The other distinct inquiry at the state level should also be whether 
defendants have historically shown any success on direct appeals claiming 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.439  If courts regularly find that 
success on direct appeal is limited, this tips the scales in favor of finding no 
meaningful opportunity and applying the Martinez exception. 
B.  Meaningful Opportunity in Arkansas, Illinois, Ohio, and Tennessee 
With these factors in mind—provision of new counsel, expansion of the 
record, recommendation by state courts, and likelihood of success—lower 
courts can more fairly evaluate a defendant’s chances of raising a genuine 
ineffective assistance claim on appeal and apply the standard for a 
meaningful opportunity.  Judges will still have to exercise discretion in 
determining how frequently defendants are permitted to use such motions 
and how often such claims in that forum are successful.  For instance, in 
Trevino, the Court found that Texas’s appellate practices that allowed for 
expansion of the record were infrequently used and rarely successful.440  
Lower court judges should examine any appellate mechanism in their state 
in a similar fashion. 
Of the four states examined above, courts found that neither Arkansas’s 
nor Ohio’s state frameworks gave defendants the requisite meaningful 
opportunity to bring ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal.441  At 
the district level, Tennessee federal courts are currently divided,442 and an 
Illinois federal court found that defendants are given a meaningful 
opportunity in direct appeals.443  Applying the above factors to each court’s 
determination, all the states fail to meet the meaningfulness benchmark.  
The determination turns on whether defendants are provided new appellate 
counsel who can, without a conflict of interest, delve into the record and 
make a meaningful claim, as the Eighth Circuit recognized in Sasser.444 
1.  Arkansas 
By focusing on the lack of new, unconflicted counsel on direct appeal, 
the Eighth Circuit in Sasser identified the key to having a meaningful 
opportunity to raise ineffective assistance claims.445  Thus, the Eighth 
Circuit correctly analyzed Arkansas’s appellate framework.  To argue 
ineffective assistance on direct appeal, Arkansas defendants either must 
proceed pro se or ask their attorneys to argue their own ineffectiveness.  
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Without new counsel, there is little chance a direct appeal on ineffective 
assistance grounds would ever truly be meaningful. 
Other facets of Arkansas law support this determination—state courts 
routinely direct that claims be raised in postconviction proceedings and 
refuse to address them on direct appeal.446 
2.  Illinois 
Although Illinois has procedures in place to help defendants claim 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal,447 there can be no 
meaningful opportunity without provision of new counsel. 
The contradictory finding in the Northern District of Illinois448—based 
on the availability of Krankel hearings449—misses the mark.  For one, 
defendants are not instructed about the possibility of filing a motion for new 
trial or the need to inform the court of their dissatisfaction with their 
attorney.  Thus, the danger remains that a defendant will not recognize the 
basis for the claim, which requires some understanding of legal tactics, until 
after the thirty-day window has passed.450  Courts cannot predicate a 
defendant’s meaningful opportunity on the chance he or she will recognize 
a basis for a claim and successfully proceed pro se.  Further, raising the 
claim is no guarantee that the court will agree to hear it in a direct appeal.451  
In fact, if the claim is outside the record, the court can instead instruct the 
defendant to file it in a postconviction motion.452  Tellingly, Illinois courts 
still recommend that defendants opt to pursue ineffective assistance claims 
in postconviction proceedings, despite the availability of such hearings.453 
3.  Ohio 
Federal district courts in Ohio rightly recognized the hurdles faced by 
defendants claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, 
finding they lack a meaningful opportunity.454 
State defendants are not provided new, unconflicted attorneys on 
appeal.455  Ohio does allow for expansion of the record, but the motion 
must be filed within fourteen days and it is rarely granted.456  Most 
problematic, however, is Ohio’s strict application of res judicata.457  The 
doctrine bars claims that were or should have been raised on direct 
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appeal.458  This rule is slightly relaxed when postconviction counsel and 
appellate counsel are the same but strictly enforced when they are not.459 
4.  Tennessee 
Tennessee fails to provide defendants with new counsel on appeal.460  
But for that fatal fact, Tennessee comes the closest to providing a 
meaningful opportunity. 
Tennessee allows defendants to motion for a new trial.461  However, in 
Tennessee, a motion for a new trial is not an optional pleading.462  In 
Tennessee, the mere act of filing the motion can expand the record for a 
later direct appeal.463  Because the motion is required in order to preserve 
issues on appeal, it is much more widely known and expected, and thus less 
likely to take defendants by surprise.464  Moreover, while the thirty-day 
deadline is strictly enforced for filing, defendants can liberally amend 
petitions to add new claims as they are realized.465 
However, without providing an unconflicted attorney on appeal, 
defendants have no meaningful opportunity to make ineffective assistance 
claims in Tennessee. Thus, the Western District of Tennessee’s holding that 
defendants lack a meaningful opportunity on direct appeal was correct, but 
premised on the wrong factors.  Two courts in the Western District held that 
because defendants in Tennessee, like defendants in Texas, most often raise 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in postconviction proceedings, 
Tennessee federal courts should apply the Martinez exception.466  Because 
of the nature of ineffective assistance claims, it is a foregone conclusion 
that most defendants will raise claims in postconviction motions, as 
opposed to on direct appeal.467  However, other flaws in the Tennessee 
system support the determination that defendants lack a meaningful 
opportunity. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s purpose in Martinez and Trevino was clear:  all defendants 
should have a real opportunity to claim their trial counsel was ineffective if 
they choose.  The right to fair trial is so fundamental that courts, despite the 
procedural bar, should rule on the merits at least once. 
Ineffective assistance claims cut to the very heart of why the justice 
system allows federal habeas review in the first place.  It preserves a 
uniform federal standard for a competent defense, “forcing trial and 
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appellate courts . . . to toe the constitutional mark.”468  Further, the 
existence of habeas review is “predicated, at least in part, on the principle 
that every defendant should have the opportunity to litigate his federal 
questions in a federal forum.”469 
Because of these concerns, lower courts should undertake a searching 
examination of their states’ appellate procedures in regard to ineffective 
assistance claims.  If states do not provide new counsel on direct appeal, 
their remaining procedures cannot offer the requisite meaningful 
opportunity.  If a state does provide new counsel, courts must continue the 
analysis, looking to procedures that allow for the expansion of the record, 
the recommendations of state counsel, the overall success of such claims on 
direct appeal, and other state-specific procedural quirks. 
That is not to say that states must provide new counsel on direct appeal—
that is beyond the scope of this Note.  This Note argues that if a state does 
not provide new counsel on direct appeal, then federal courts within its 
jurisdiction must adopt the Martinez exception and allow the actions of 
postconviction counsel to serve as cause to excuse a procedurally defaulted 
ineffective assistance claim. 
There are still safeguards in place to prevent the filing of frivolous claims 
that seek to delay or confuse already overburdened courts.  Showing cause-
and-prejudice to excuse a procedural default is a difficult task, even 
including the actions of postconviction counsel in the analysis. 
Furthermore, the Court in Martinez also required that the underlying claim 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel be substantial, allowing federal 
courts to dismiss insubstantial claims at the outset. 
This approach protects cherished individual rights with only the slightest 
deviation from the principles of federalism and finality.  It gives deserving 
defendants a pathway—though still a treacherous, difficult one—by which 
to vindicate substantial, meaningful claims of ineffective assistance. 
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